Gender-Based Violence in International Human Rights Law: Evolution Towards a Binding Post-Binary Framework by Ziniakova, Tatsiana
William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice 
Volume 27 (2020-2021) 
Issue 3 Article 4 
April 2021 
Gender-Based Violence in International Human Rights Law: 
Evolution Towards a Binding Post-Binary Framework 
Tatsiana Ziniakova 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
Repository Citation 
Tatsiana Ziniakova, Gender-Based Violence in International Human Rights Law: Evolution 
Towards a Binding Post-Binary Framework, 27 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 709 (2021), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol27/iss3/4 
Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN




The present Article seeks to analyze the notion of gender-based
violence, in light of the evolving gender discourse, and identify the
problems associated with effectively addressing it in international
human rights law. It analyzes the definitions of gender, enshrined in
various human rights documents, and suggests using performative
theory of gender to form a comprehensive view on gender-based vio-
lence. It also critically addresses three aspects of regulating gender-
based violence: inclusivity, patriarchy, and normativity. It concludes
that, in the long term, the commitment to eradicate gender-based
violence should be strengthened by framing it as a binding treaty obli-
gation on the universal human rights level, while in the short term it
can continue to be strengthened through a developing body of juris-
prudence and authoritative interpretations of standing instruments.
INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
I. GENDER AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
II. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF REGULATING GENDER-BASED
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A. Amending Existing Instruments
B. Adopting New Instruments
C. Interpreting Existing Instruments Revolutionarily
INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
In the words of the United Nations Secretary-General, “there is
simply no way that the world can achieve the 17 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals without also achieving gender equality.”1 There are
still some years left before it is time to assess the progress made on
2030 Agenda, but the declared ambition to eliminate discrimination
and violence2 has proven hard to fulfill. Gender-based violence is a
major factor undermining gender equality worldwide.3 Violence is
practiced by intimate partners, colleagues, strangers, family mem-
bers, enemy’s soldiers, soldiers of one’s own state, peacekeepers,4 po-
lice officers.5 It can be sexual, physical, psychological, or economic.6
It can occur in peacetime and wartime, online,7 and offline.8 Its
1. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on SDG Progress 2019, Sp.
Ed., U.N. Doc. E/2019/68, at ii (May 8, 2019).
2. G.A. Res., 70/1, 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, ¶ 20 (Sept. 25, 2015).
3. Id.
4. Sophie Genovese, Prosecuting U.N. Peacekeepers for Sexual and Gender-Based
Violence in the Central African Republic, BROOKLYN J. INT’L. L. 609, 611 (2018); Skye
Wheeler, UN Peacekeeping has a Sexual Abuse Problem, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/11/un-peacekeeping-has-sexual-abuse-problem.
5. Payal Seth, As COVID-19 Raged, the Shadow Pandemic of Domestic Violence
Swept Across the Globe, THE WIRE (Jan. 23, 2021), https://thewire.in/women/covid-19-do
mestic-violence-hdr-2020 [https://perma.cc/5DG2-RQKC]; Ignacio Torres, A Silent “Col-
league”: Violence Against Women in the Workplace, DIANOVA (Apr. 2017), https://www.
dianova.org/news/a-silent-colleague-violence-against-women-in-the-workplace [https://
perma.cc/99EV-R2CA]; Ella Torres, Military Sexual Assault Victims Say The System Is
Broken, ABC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/military-sexual-assault
-victims-system-broken/story?id=72499053 [https://perma.cc/YQ6R-CGSV]; Alexander
Heal, Nowhere to Turn: Women Say Domestic Abuse by Police Officers Goes Unpunished,
THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.thebureauin
vestigates.com/stories/2019-05-01/police-perpetrators-domestic-violence [https://perma
.cc/6TXN-XF2U]; Genovese, supra note 4, at 611; Wheeler, supra note 4.
6. Forms of Violence, EURO. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL., https://eige.europa.eu/gen
der-based-violence/forms-of-violence [https://perma.cc/G4GP-KV6W].
7. UNHRC, Online Violence Against Women And Girls, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/47
(June 14, 2018); ANASTASIA POWELL & NICOLA HENRY, SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN A DIGITAL
AGE 1–2 (2017).
8. Wheeler, supra note 4; Muhammad Lila & Martha Raddatz, U.S. Solider Accused
of Killing 16 Afghans Including Women and Children, ABC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2012), https://
abcnews.go.com/International/us-soldier-accused-killing-16-afghans-including-women
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survivors are found on every side of the gender spectrum.9 In a world,
where patriarchal gender stereotypes continue to fuel abuse and
aggression, the progress in achieving gender equality can only be
marginal.10 However, if the international community is to adhere to
its equality commitments, it is crucial to analyze whether interna-
tional law has developed a proper gender lens to effectively address
gender-based violence.
Prima facie the concept of equality between sexes seems to have
been historically integrated in the fabric of modern international law.
References to equal rights of men and women appear in the texts of
fundamental instruments of public international law, human rights
law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law.
The United Nations Charter reflects the intention “to reaffirm
faith . . . in the equal rights of men and women”11 and the commit-
ment to “place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women
to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality” in any
of the United Nations bodies.12 The creation of the Commission on
the Status of Women a year after the establishment of the United
Nations supported the declared pursuit of equality.13
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights reiterates the word-
ing of the United Nations Charter in its preamble.14 Both the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contain binding
obligations to “ensure the equal right of men and women” to the en-
joyment of all rights thereunder.15 Nondiscrimination on the basis
of sex is also enshrined in regional human rights instruments.16
/story?id=15897098 [https://perma.cc/ZC9Q-5XM5]; UNHRC, supra note 7; POWELL &
HENRY, supra note 7, at 1–2.
9. U.N. Charter, pmbl.; CEDAW, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; U.N., Rome Statute
of the Int’l Criminal Court art. 7(1)(h) July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 [hereinafter
U.N. Rome Statute]; C. Nadine Wathen, True or False? Men and Women Face Violence in
Their Relationships Equally, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 20, 2018), https://theconversa
tion.com/true-or-false-men-and-women-face-violence-in-their-relationships-equally-121
540 [https://perma.cc/9FLA-NU4S].
10. Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999
UNIV. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 22 (1999).
11. U.N. Charter, pmbl.
12. U.N. Charter, art. 8.
13. Economic and Social Council Res., U.N. Doc. 1946/29, 525–26 (July 13, 1946); see
also Economic and Social Council Rep. on the Comm’n of Women, U.N. Doc. E/2013/27
(Mar. 15, 2013).
14. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. (Dec. 10,
1948).
15. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 3, 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Int’l Cov. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
art. 3, Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
16. Eur. Conv. on Human Rights (ECHR) art. 14, Sept. 21, 1970, 213 U.N.T.S. 222;
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In the field of international humanitarian law, the four Geneva
Conventions, as well as Additional Protocols I and II prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.17 All of these fundamental instru-
ments also contain specific provisions dedicated to the treatment of
women during armed conflict.18
In the domain of international criminal law, the Rome Statute
recognizes “persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity
on . . . gender . . . grounds” as a crime against humanity if certain
qualifying criteria are met.19
Several treaties have been adopted to specifically combat gender
discrimination and violence, such as the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Inter-Amer-
ican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence against Women [hereinafter Convention of Belém do Pará],
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa [hereinafter Maputo Protocol], and the
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Vio-
lence against Women and Domestic Violence [hereinafter Istanbul
Amer. Conv. on Human Rights, art. 1, Aug. 27, 1979, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 3 ¶ 20, June 27, 1981 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; League of
Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 3, Mar. 15, 2008. Note, however, that Art.
3(3) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights also enshrines “positive discrimination of
women,” stating that:
Men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and obliga-
tions within the framework of the positive discrimination established in
favour of women by the Islamic Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable
laws and legal instruments. Accordingly, each State party pledges to take
all the requisite measures to guarantee equal opportunities and effective
equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all the rights set out
in this Charter.
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 3(3), Mar. 15, 2008 (emphasis
added).
17. Geneva Conv. for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [here-
inafter Geneva Conv. I]; Geneva Conv. for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Conv. II]; Geneva Conv. Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Conv. III]; Geneva Conv. Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Conv. IV]; Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conv. of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Int’l Armed Conflicts, art. 9(1), 75(1) 1125 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I]; Protocol II Additions to the Geneva Conv. of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Int’l Armed Conflicts, art. 2 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
18. Geneva Conv. I, supra note 17, art. 12; Geneva Conv. II, supra note 17, art. 12;
Geneva Conv. III, supra note 17, art. 14, 25, 29, 97, 108; Geneva Conv. IV, supra note 17,
art. 27, 38, 76, 85, 124; Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 76; Additional Protocol II,
supra note 17, art. 5(2)(a).
19. U.N. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(h).
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Convention].20 Moreover, gender-based violence has been addressed
in the jurisprudence of universal21 and regional22 human rights bodies.
20. Conv. on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, pmbl.,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Inter-Am. Convention on the Pre-
vention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, pmbl., Mar. 5, 1995,
33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994) [hereinafter Conv. of Belém do Pará]; Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, pmbl., Sept. 13,
2000, CAB/LEG/66.6 [hereinafter Maputo Protocol]; Council of Europe Conv. on Prevent-
ing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, pmbl., Apr. 7, 2011,
C.E.T.S. No. 210 [hereinafter Istanbul Conv.].
21. See, e.g., Natalia Ciobanu v. Republic of Moldova, Communication No. 104/2016,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 (Nov. 4, 2016); Zhen Zhen Zheng v. The Netherlands,
Communication No. 15/2007, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/42/D/15/2007 (Nov. 14, 2008); Karen
Tayag Vertido v. The Philippines, Communication No. 18/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46
/D/18/2008 (Sept. 1, 2010); Kell v. Canada, Communication No. 19/2008, U.N. Doc. CE
DAW/C/51/19/2008 (Aug. 28, 2008); V.K. v. Bulgaria, Communication No. CEDAW/C/49/D
/20/2008 (July 25, 2011); Inga Abramova v. Belarus, Communication No. 23/2009, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009 (Sept. 27, 2011); X and Y v. Georgia, Communication No.
24/2009, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/55/D/24/2009 (Oct. 29, 2009); R.K.B. v. Turkey, Commu-
nication No. 28/2010, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/51/D/28/2010 (Apr. 13, 2012); Isatou Jallow
v. Bulgaria, Communication No. 31/2011 U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (Nov. 24,
2012); R.P.B. v. The Philippines, Communication No. 34/2011, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/57
/D/34/2011 (Mar. 12, 2014); Angela González Carreño v. Spain, Communication No. 47
/2012, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 (July 16, 2014); Goekce v. Austria Commu-
nication No. 5/2005, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C39/D/5/2005 (Aug. 6, 2007); Fatma Yildirim v.
Austria, Communication No. 6/2005, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (Oct. 1, 2007); S.T.
v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 100/2016, U.N. Doc., CEDAW/C/73/D/100
/2016 (Aug. 9, 2019); X. v. Timor-Leste, Communication No. 88/2015, U.N. Doc. CEDAW
/C/69/D/88/2015 (Apr. 25, 2018); S.L. v. Bulgaria, Communication No. 99/2016, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/73/D/99/2016 (Sept. 10, 2019); A.T. v. Hungary, Communication No. 2/2003,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005).
22. See, e.g., APDF and IHRDA v. Mali, Communication No. 046/2016, African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (May 11, 2018); A. v. Croatia, App. No. 55164/08
(Oct. 14, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-101152%22]}
[https://perma.cc/279B-M37Y]; B.V. v. Belgium, App. No. 61030/08 (Feb. 5, 2017), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-173480%22]} [https://perma.cc/WX9G
-LDHY]; B lsan v. Romania, App. No. 49645/09 (May 23, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-173619 [https://perma.cc/7EYD-YTRU]; Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, App. No. 711
27/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 12, 2008); Tomaši  v. Croatia, App. No. 21753/02, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (Oct. 19, 2006); or evi  v. Croatia, App. No. 41526/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 24, 2012);
Eremia v. The Republic of Moldova, App. No. 3564/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 28, 2013);
Hajduová v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660.03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 30, 2010); Irina Smirnova
v. Ukraine, App. No. 1870/05 (Oct. 13, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-167118
[https://perma.cc/9D4C-BTR5]; Kalucza v. Hungary, App. No. 57693/10 (Apr. 24, 2012);
Kontrová v. Slovakia, App. No. 7510/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 31, 2007); M.C. v. Bulgaria,
App. No. 39272/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 4, 2003); O’Keeffe v. Ireland, App. No. 35810/09,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 16, 2009); Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 9,
2009); Rumor v. Italy, App. No. 72964/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 27, 2014); Siliadin v. France,
App. No. 73316/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 26, 2005); Talpis v. Italy, App. No. 41237/14
(Mar. 21, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-171994 [https://perma.cc/P3X8
-A5KE]; V.C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 11, 2011); Valiulien
v. Lithuania, App. No. 33234/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 26, 2013); Volodina v. Russia, App.
No. 41261/17 (July 9, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194321 [https://perma
.cc/K2D3-CL8R]; Y. v. Slovenia, App. No. 41107/10 (May 28, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-154728 [https://perma.cc/BQB4-L9M8]; Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”)
v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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There are quasi-legal commitments to address gender-based
violence in parts of the world that do not have standalone regional
human rights bodies, such as the Declaration of the Advancement
of Women in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Region,23
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Region,24 and the Arab
Strategy for Combating Violence Against Women.25
Nonbinding yet influential instruments have been developed, such
as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,26 the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence against Women,27 the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action,28 the Yogyakarta Principles on
the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, as well as the Additional
Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Iden-
tity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the
Yogyakarta Principles.29
The United Nations Human Rights Council has consistently used
tools at its disposal to address gender-based violence.30 The United
(ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009); “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211 (Nov. 24,
2009); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160 (Nov. 25, 2006); Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, Prelim. Obj.,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 277 (May 19, 2014); Vicky
Hernández and Family, Honduras, Case 13.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. 157/18,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170, doc. 179 (2018); Maria Da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case
12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 (2000);
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al., United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Rep. No. 80/11 (2011); Indravani Pamela Ramjattan, Trinidad and Tobago, Case 11.837,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. 31/14, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.150, doc. 35 (2014).
23. 1988 Decl. of the Advancement of Women in the Assoc. of Southeast Asian Nations
Region, July 5, 1988, 35 I.L.M. (1996).
24. ASEAN 2012—Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations Region (Oct. 12, 2012).
25. Haifa Abu Ghazaleh, Arab Strategy for Combating Violence Against Women, ARAB
WOMEN ORG. (2011), http://www.arabwomenorg.org/content/publications/vaweng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZR5-B983].
26. World Conf. on Human Rights, Vienna Decl. and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993).
27. G.A. Res. 48/104, Decl. on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW),
art. 4(f), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter U.N. DEVAW].
28. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS (ICJ), The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
(Mar. 2007) [hereinafter The Yogyakarta Principles].
29. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS (ICJ), The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10—Additional
Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International Human Rights Law
in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Char-
acteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles (Nov. 10, 2017) [hereinafter The
Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10].
30. See U.N. Women, Work of the Human Rights Council (2006–present) and the
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Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar and the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
have issued separate reports on sexual and gender-based violence
in the respective countries.31 Similarly, the mandates of the Group
of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen32 and the
Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan33 provide for a gender
dimension. Gender-based violence also falls within the mandate of
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences, the Independent Expert on protection against vio-
lence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, and the Working Group on discrimination against women
and girls.34 However, twenty-five years into the existence of the first
mandate, the most recent report of the Special Rapporteur on violence
against women concludes that “gender-based violence against women
and girls continues to be tolerated and has become normalized in
many societies.”35 The Independent Expert on Protection Against
Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity continues to highlight a “grave concern at acts of violence
and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against
individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.”36
Commission on Human Rights (until 2006), U.N., https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw
/vaw/v-hrc.htm [https://perma.cc/5Y2N-CS2R].
31. H.R.C., Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar and the Gendered
Impact of Its Ethnic Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/CRP.4, pmbl. (Aug. 22, 2019) [here-
inafter H.R.C., Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar]; H.R.C., “I Lost My
Dignity”: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/37/CRP.3, pmbl. (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter H.R.C., “I Lost My Dignity”].
32. H.R.C., Human Rights, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building in Yemen,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/39/21, ¶ 11 (Oct. 8, 2018).
33. H.R.C., Situation of Human Rights in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/56, 2
(Jan. 31, 2020).
34. See H.R.C., Violence Against Women, Its Causes And Consequences, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/41/42, ¶ 44 (June 20, 2019) stating:
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights con-
sidered the impact of fundamentalism and extremism on the cultural rights
of women (A/72/155), and, in 2017, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of
persons with disabilities examined the challenges experienced by girls and
young women with disabilities in relation to their sexual and reproductive
health and rights (A/72/133). The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, sum-
mary or arbitrary executions considered key elements of a gender-sensitive
perspective to the mandate (A/HRC/35/23), while the Special Rapporteur on
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health included a section on women, the right to health
and confinement in his report (A/HRC/38/36) (emphasis added).
35. Id. ¶ 95.
36. H.R.C. Res. 17/1, U.N. Doc. A.HRC/17/1 (June 15, 2011); H.R.C., Rep. of the In-
dependent Expert on Protection Against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38.43 (May 11, 2018); H.R.C. Res.
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On the face of it, international law, albeit often adopting a binary
view of gender, does not seem to be completely gender blind.37 Binding
and nonbinding documents have been adopted to ensure equality.38
Platforms, organizations, and mandates have been created to achieve
the same end.39 However, pervasive gender problems remain invisible
and unaddressed up to the present day.40 The instances of gender-
based violence in Myanmar,41 Iraq,42 Syria,43 DRC,44 Haiti,45 Mexico,46
and India47 have received attention from the international commu-
nity in recent years, but they are far from being the only ones.48
Gender-based violence continues to affect communities in developed
and developing countries, in peacetime and wartime, and irrespec-
tive of whether survivors identify within or beyond the “traditional”
gender binary.49
32/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/2 (July 15, 2016) [hereinafter H.R.C., Rep. of the Inde-
pendent Expert].
37. Economic and Social Council Res., 1946/29 (July 13, 1946).
38. World Conf. on Human Rights, supra note 26; ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 3.
39. DRC: Women and Girls’ Bodies Are Not Battlegrounds, U.N. OFF. FOR THE CO-
ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (May 13, 2019), https://www.unocha.org/story
/drc-%E2%80%9Cwomen-and-girls%E2%80%99-bodies-are-not-battlegrounds %E2%80
%9D [https://perma.cc/F2KC-QZUY].
40. See Dubravka Šimonovi  (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its
Causes and Consequences), Rep. on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Conse-
quences, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/42 (June 20, 2019) [hereinafter Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence
Against Women]; U.N. Women, Work of the Human Rights Council (2006–present) and
the Commission on Human Rights (until 2006), supra note 30.
41. See The Gambia v. Myanmar, Order on Provisional Measures, 2020 I.C.J. ¶ 73
(Jan. 23); The Gambia v. Myanmar, Verbatim Record 2019 I.C.J. (Dec. 12); H.R.C.,
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar, supra note 31.
42. See Nadia Murad, My People Were Massacred Five Years Ago. The Genocide
Continues, WASH. POST (July 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/global-opinions/my-people-were-massacred-five-years-ago-the-genocide-continues/2019
/07/31/b4ee1352-b24f-11e9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html [https://perma.cc/2JP9-4AXC].
43. See H.R.C., “I Lost My Dignity,” supra note 31.
44. See DRC: Women and Girls’ Bodies Are Not Battlegrounds, supra note 39.
45. See Wheeler, supra note 4.
46. See Paulina Villegas, In Mexico, Women Go on Strike Nationwide to Protest
Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/ameri
cas/mexico-women-strike-protest.html? [https://perma.cc/KZ5D-K8CT]; Inquiry Rep. on
Mexico, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (Jan. 27, 2005).
47. See Neeta Lal, Addressing Rape in India, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 21, 2020), https://
thediplomat.com/2020/01/addressing-rape-in-india [https://perma.cc/AE4N-5Z79]; NALINI
NATARAJAN, THE UNSAFE SEX: THE FEMALE BINARY AND PUBLIC VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ix (2016).
48. See Rep. of the Inquiry Concerning Canada, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/OP.8/CAN/1
(Mar. 30, 2015); Summary of the Inquiry Concerning the Philippines, U.N. Doc. CEDAW
/C/OP.8/PHL/1 (Apr. 22, 2015); Rep. of the Inquiry Concerning the U.K., U.N. Doc. CE
DAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 (Feb. 23, 2018).
49. WHO, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: PREVA-
LENCE AND HEALTHEFFECTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND NON-PARTNER SEXUAL
2021] GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 717
Armed conflicts often, if not always, notoriously result in “turning
women’s bodies into battlefields.”50 Gender-based violence as a tactic
of war has recently been addressed at the 8514th Meeting of the
United Nations Security Council, which adopted Resolution 2467
(2019) on conflict-related sexual violence.51 It reiterated the “demand
for the complete cessation . . . of all acts of sexual violence”52 and
recognized that the situation of armed conflict “exacerbates the fre-
quency and brutality . . . of gender-based violence.”53
Survivors of violence often feel no safer in their own home than
they do in the battlefield. Domestic violence all too often goes in-
visible, unreported, and unpunished.54 For many home is a place of
pain and humiliation.55 According to the World Health Organization,
almost one third of all women who have been in a relationship have
experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate part-
ner.56 The non-physical forms of violence, such as economic57 or
psychological violence are no less harmful.58 Despite the unsettling
statistics, legislation addressing gender-based violence often re-
mains nonexistent, inadequate, or poorly implemented.59
Violence in armed conflict and domestic violence are but two of
the forms that gender-based violence may take. Human trafficking,
genital mutilation, forced marriages, and sexual harassment in the
workplace also fall within the ambit of gender-based violence.60
VIOLENCE (Oct. 20, 2013) [hereinafter WHO, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN]; Wathen, supra note 9.
50. DRC: Women and Girls’ Bodies Are Not Battlegrounds, supra note 39; SUSAN
DEWEY, CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, LOCAL RESPONSES
1–2 (Tonia St. Germain & Susan Dewey eds., 2012); SARA SHARRATT, GENDER, SHAME
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE VOICES OF WITNESSES AND COURT MEMBERS AT WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS ix (2011).
51. S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019); see also S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
52. S.C. Res. 2467, ¶ 1 (Apr. 23, 2019).
53. Id. ¶ 2.
54. Enrique Gracia, Unreported Cases of Domestic Violence Against Women: Towards
an Epidemiology of Social Silence Tolerance and Inhibition, J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY.
HEALTH 536, 536, 537 (2004).
55. WHO, MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN’S HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, at viii (2005).
56. WHO, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 49, at 1.
57. Olufunmilayo Fawole, Economic Violence to Women and Girls, TRAUMA,VIOLENCE,
AND ABUSE 1, 2 (2008).
58. WHO, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 49, at 7.
59. U.N., Gen. Rec. No. 35, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35 (July 14, 2017) [herein-
after U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35].
60. Infographic: Violence Against Women, U.N.WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en
/digital-library/multimedia/2015/11/infographic-violence-against-women [https://perma
.cc/K3UM-8WEV].
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Despite the variety of legal instruments and procedures designed
to combat gender-based violence, the status quo seems to suggest
that the international community is far from succeeding. It begs sev-
eral questions on the effectiveness of the existing international legal
framework. Is international law failing if patterns of gender-based
violence repeat in all major armed conflicts and persist in the peace-
time? Is continued gender-based violence a consequence of ineffec-
tive implementation of international law by states? Is international
law generally ill-fitted to meaningfully address gender-based vio-
lence? Does the fact that international law is shaped by states and,
therefore, mostly by men who rule the states, have any bearing on
effectively combating gender-based violence? All these questions are
relevant to comprehensively addressing gender-based violence.
It must be understood that gender-based violence will never be
“solved” by strictly legal means. It is deeply rooted in long-standing
patriarchal gender stereotypes and its prevention would require
“major social changes in communities, families, and nations.”61 In
the words of American anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, “for human
rights ideas to have an impact, they need to become part of con-
sciousness of ordinary people around the world.”62 Indeed, a major
mindset shift is a sine qua non of overcoming gender-based violence.
The evolution of international human rights law can inspire such
shift and help change the paradigm.
While the problem of gender-based violence is addressed by
various fields of international law, including notably international
humanitarian law and international criminal law, this Article will
primarily focus on gender-based violence within the realm of in-
ternational human rights law. However, there may be intersections
with other fields of international law, for instance, to the extent that
international humanitarian law and human rights law can simulta-
neously or complementarily apply in situations of armed conflict.63
The present Article seeks to analyze the notion of gender-based
violence in light of the evolving gender discourse and identify the
problems associated with effectively addressing gender-based violence
in international human rights law.
Part I of the Article is dedicated to the category of gender, which
is central to the discussion of gender-based violence. It analyzes the
definitions of gender, enshrined in various human rights documents,
61. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 2 (2006).
62. Id. at 3.
63. ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Op., 2004 I.C.J. 131 at 105 (July 9).
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and suggests using performative theory of gender to form a compre-
hensive view on gender-based violence.
Part II of the Article critically addresses three aspects of regulat-
ing gender-based violence: inclusivity, patriarchy, and normativity.
First, the Article analyzes the inclusivity of existing human rights
instruments tackling gender-based violence and their potential in
addressing violence committed against persons within and beyond
the gender binary. Second, the Article draws attention to patriarchy
as one of the major causes of gender-based violence. It notes the
interconnectedness of patriarchy and heteronormativity, suggesting
that violence against women and violence against sexual minorities
are often motivated by the same patriarchal beliefs. It also cautions
against stereotypical perception of cultures as more or less prone to
gender-based violence and encourages to focus on patriarchy within
cultures instead. Third, the Article analyzes the normative value of
the prohibition of gender-based violence in international human
rights law. It concludes that, in the long term, the commitment to
eradicate gender-based violence should be strengthened by framing
it as a binding treaty obligation on the universal human rights level,
while in the short term it can continue to be strengthened through
a developing body of jurisprudence and authoritative interpretations
of standing instruments.
I. GENDER AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
Gender-based violence has been on the agenda of governments,
international organizations, judicial bodies, and academia for decades.
Undeniably, having more and more voices speak about it helps raise
awareness about the problem. Yet when discussing gender-based
violence, it is important to avoid contradictory and exclusionary lan-
guage. Analyzing the concept of gender (without necessarily picking
the ultimate “correct” definition thereof) is a necessary first step
towards coherent understanding of the matter.
One of the difficulties in regulating gender-based violence is the
lack of consensus as to what “gender” means. International legal
instruments often omit the word “gender,” adhering to the binary
categories of men and women. For instance, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [herein-
after CEDAW] did not initially reference gender in its text. The word
first appeared in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women [hereinafter CEDAW Committee] General Recom-
mendation No. 9 in 1989, ten years after the adoption of CEDAW,
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but remained undefined.64 Twenty-one years after the term’s first
appearance, it was defined in General Recommendation No. 28 in
2010 as “socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women
and men and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biologi-
cal differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women
and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men
and disadvantaging women” and expressly distinguished from a
biological category of “sex.”65 This CEDAW Committee’s definition
embodied a progressive understanding of gender, reflecting its con-
structed nature. Making the gender/sex distinction was an important
milestone in the CEDAW framework, even though it did not auto-
matically extend the application of CEDAW beyond the gender binary.
A number of instruments reference gender without defining it,
such as the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women66 and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment, and the Convention of Belém do Pará.67 The Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights
of Women in Africa does not define gender either, but notably de-
fines “women” as persons of “female gender”68—a definition somewhat
controversial in current gender discourse.
In the realm of international labor law, in the text of the Vio-
lence and Harassment Convention, signed under the auspices of
International Labor Organization and pending entry into force in
2021, the terms “sex” and “gender” are not defined but expressly
distinguished.69
Some instruments both incorporate the term and purport to de-
fine it. In the domain of international criminal law, the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court recognizes “persecution against
any identifiable group or collectivity on . . . gender . . . grounds” as
a crime against humanity,70 but proceeds to define gender in strictly
binary terms, as “the two sexes, male and female, within the context
of society.”71
64. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 9, Statistical Data Concerning the Situation of
Women, Preamble, CEDAW, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1989).
65. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 28, Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article
2 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
¶ 2, CEDAW, U.N. Doc. C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010).
66. U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, art. 4(f).
67. Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20, art. 1.
68. Maputo Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1(k).
69. Int’l Labor Org., Conv. Concerning the Elimination of Violence and Harassment
in the World of Work, June 21, 2019, 58 I.L.M. 1170.
70. U.N. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(h).
71. Id. art. 7(3).
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The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, akin to CEDAW Com-
mittee General Recommendation No. 28, progressively defines gender
as “socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes
that a given society considers appropriate for women and men.”72
A similar view on gender is taken by the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions Agnes Callamard,
who defined gender as “social attributes and opportunities associ-
ated with being male and female, an evolving social and ideological
construct that justifies inequality and a way of categorizing, order-
ing and symbolizing power relations.”73 She proceeded by stating
that gender “is not synonymous with or equivalent to sex.”74
The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity [hereinafter Yogyakarta Principles 2007], a nonbinding
document claiming to reflect “binding international legal standards,”75
takes a different approach. It does not define gender per se but pro-
vides elaborate definitions of gender identity and sexual orientation.76
Gender identity is defined as:
Each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of
gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned
at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may
involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or
function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expres-
sions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.77
Sexual orientation is understood to refer to “each person’s capacity for
profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate
and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the
same gender or more than one gender.”78
The Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Applica-
tion of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Charac-
teristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles [hereinafter
72. The Conv. on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic
Violence, art. 3(c) Nov. 5, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210.
73. Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions), Report on a Gender-Sensitive Approach to Arbitrary Killings, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/35/23, ¶ 16 (June 6, 2017).
74. Id. ¶ 17.
75. The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 28, pmbl.
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 2.
78. Id. ¶ 1.
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Yogyakarta Principles 2017] extended the scope of the document to
include gender expression79 and sex characteristics.80 This approach
is effective because, instead of running the risk of defining gender
in essentialist terms, the drafters concentrate on manifestations of
gender—inter alia, sex characteristics, gender identity, and gender
expression.81
None of the abovementioned instruments has a monopoly on
defining gender. Gender is not merely a legal, but a societal and philo-
sophical category. Defining gender is an ambitious endeavor that
can be subject to a lengthy philosophical debate. Even though the at-
tempt to formulate the ultimate definition may be futile, harmonizing
the understanding of gender across human rights systems is essen-
tial. Different legal instruments, built upon different understandings
of gender, create a risk of potential fragmentation of international
human rights law. Fragmentation can mean that people, notably
transgender and nonbinary persons,82 subjected to violence on the
same gendered grounds as cisgender women, would have to seek
remedies for human rights violations under different instruments,
because they were never contemplated to be the beneficiaries of cer-
tain human rights regimes. To avoid this outcome, a postmodern
gender discourse, which increasingly dominates the way sex and
gender are discussed in the twenty-first century, could be integrated
into human rights frameworks.
The famous assertion of French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir
that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”83 paved way for
discussion of gender in the twentieth century. Something previously
seen as indisputable was brought into question. Indeed, if the ex-
pectations of womanhood (such as women’s primary role as care-
givers, submissiveness, lack of political will, etc.) are constructed by
the society to benefit the privileged groups, how could one still claim
that womanhood as an objective given?
79. Defined as “each person’s presentation of the person’s gender through physical
appearance—including dress, hairstyles, accessories, cosmetics—and mannerisms, speech,
behavioural patterns, names and personal references.” The Yogyakarta Principles Plus
10, supra note 29, ¶ 1.
80. Defined as “each person’s physical features relating to sex, including genitalia
and other sexual and reproductive anatomy, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary
physical features emerging from puberty.” Id. pmbl.
81. Id.
82. Transgender people may or may not identify as nonbinary, hence the distinction.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., Understanding Non-Binary People: How to
Be Respectful and Supportive (Oct. 5, 2018), https://transequality.org/issues/resources
/understanding-non-binary-people-how-to-be-respectful-and-supportive [https://perma
.cc/6SC3-4E9Z].
83. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 283 (2010).
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Beauvoir’s argument is not well taken by many. It is not uncom-
mon to argue that even though some aspects of womanhood and
manhood may be acquired, it is a medically established fact that a
person is born either a man or a woman.84 While it is true that
people are typically assigned sex at birth, even the seemingly indis-
putable duality of “biological sex” may be brought into question by
the very existence of intersex people.85 Clearly, if even the biological
difference between the “two sexes” can get blurred, defining gender
in binary terms would be still more controversial and excluding.
French feminist Monique Wittig challenged the notion of sex as
an “immediate given . . . belonging to a natural order,” stating that
it is more of a “mythic construction . . . which reinterprets physical
features (in themselves as neutral as others, but marked by a social
system), through the network of relationships in which they are per-
ceived.”86 Along the same lines, French philosopher Michel Foucault
described sex as a unique signifier, that made it possible for people
to group together, in an “artificial unity.”87 These viewpoints on the
socially constructed categories of sex and gender were analyzed and
put into perspective by American philosopher Judith Butler in her
renowned work Gender Trouble.88
Instead of characterizing gender as fictitious, artificial, or non-
real, Butler famously described it as performative.89 The corollary of
her work states that “there is no gender identity behind the expres-
sions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the
very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”90 In a way, it is a
postmodern elaboration on Beauvoir’s idea of “becoming a woman.”
If womanhood or manhood is acquired and reaffirmed by continually
84. AM. COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS, Gender Ideology Harms Children (Sept. 2017),
https://www.medicinaepersona.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.30.17b-Gender-Ideol
ogy-Harms-Children-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BWQ-2MWV]; see also American
College of Pediatricians, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/ex
tremist-files/group/american-college-pediatricians [https://perma.cc/7388-G9H3] (display-
ing that the Southern Poverty Law Center designates the American College of Pediatri-
cians as a fringe hate group against LGBTQ individuals).
85. Genetic Components of Sex and Gender, WHO, https://www.who.int/genomics/gen
der/en [https://perma.cc/54WA-YUJE]; SHARON PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE
CONTESTED SELF 2–4 (2003); BRUCE HENDERSON, QUEER STUDIES: BEYOND BINARIES
105–06 (2019); DAVID A RUBIN, INTERSEX MATTERS: BIOMEDICAL EMBODIMENT, GENDER
REGULATION, AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 51 (2017).
86. MONIQUE WITTIG, THE STRAIGHT MIND AND OTHER ESSAYS 11–12 (1992); JUDITH
P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 114 (1st ed. 1990).
87. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 154
(1978); BUTLER, supra note 86, at 92.
88. BUTLER, supra note 86, at 92, 114.
89. Id. at 24.
90. Id. at 25.
724 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:709
practicing manly and womanly behaviors (manners, choice of clothes,
choice of profession, division of household chores, etc.), then what is
gender if not the constant process of performing these behaviors?
Butler concludes that “because there is neither an ‘essence’ that gen-
der expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender
aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender cre-
ate an idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no gender
at all.”91 In Butler’s view, this absence of objective characteristics of
gender, makes it “a construction that regularly conceals its genesis.”92
This view remains prevalent in contemporary feminist scholarship.93
So, what is gender? Performativity of gender implies that there
is no exhaustive answer to that question. Gender is what one does,
not what one is.94 It is helpful to think about it as a package95 or a
spectrum,96 that includes, but is not limited to, one’s sex characteris-
tics (inter alia, assigned sex, bodily traits, hormone levels), gender
identity (internal sense of self-identification), and gender expression
(behaviors and attributes of self-expression, e.g., clothing, makeup,
hairstyle).97
Performative theory of gender is instrumental in changing the
human rights law approach to gender-based violence. Thinking be-
yond the binary helps realize that gender equality is not merely
equality between the two sexes. International legal instruments have
long sought to afford special protection to women and girls, because
they have historically been primary targets of gender-based violence.98
While it is not empirically untrue, gender-based violence is directed at
not just cisgender women, but those practicing femininity, or generally
ill-fitting into a binary gender role.99 Violence is often seen as punish-
ment for failure of people to conform to gender behaviors that they
are expected to practice.100 Transgender and gender nonconforming
91. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. See THE BLOOMSBURY HANDBOOK OF 21ST-CENTURY FEMINIST THEORY (Robin
Truth Goodman ed., 2019).
94. Id. at 43–44.
95. Nancy Felipe Russo & Angela Pirlott, Gender Based Violence. Concepts, Methods,
and Findings, 1087 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 178, 180 (2006).
96. Surya Monro, Beyond Male and Female: Poststructuralism and the Spectrum of
Gender, 8 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 3, 7 (2005).
97. NICHOLAS M. TEICH, TRANSGENDER 101: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO A COMPLEX ISSUE
6–10 (2012).
98. ANCA-RUXANDRA PANDEA ET AL., GENDER MATTERS: A MANUAL ON ADDRESSING
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AFFECTING YOUNG PEOPLE 17 (2019).
99. Id.
100. Vicky Hernández and Family, Honduras, Case 13.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Rep. No. 157/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170, doc. 179 ¶ 61 (2018). “[A] considerable proportion
of the incidents of torture carried out against [LGBT persons] suggests that they are
often subjected to violence of a sexual nature, such as rape or sexual assault, in order to
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people are targeted for “masquerading” as the “wrong” gender.101
Violence against men and boys often includes emasculating practices
sought to symbolically undermine their masculinity.102 Violence
against women and girls often relates to the idea of coercing them
into a “traditional” role of submitting to men’s will.
Embracing the idea of gender as a performance, rather than a
trait, has a promising potential of extending explicit human rights
guarantees to vulnerable groups. Yet it is not immune to criticism.
Some are skeptical about a postmodernist approach to gender for the
lack of attention it provides to “the lived experience of the body”103 and
for the “lack of political awareness.”104 Some feminists state that
referring to women as a group may be necessary “to make represen-
tational claims in their behalf”105 in current political realities. Some
claim that the obsession with attacking the “falsely hegemonic cate-
gories” of women and men “has put feminism in a bind”106 or “trapped
feminist thinking in an echo chamber.”107 Instead of “answering the
call of the Symbolic to decide once and for all what a woman is or
what ‘woman’ does” feminist scholars encourage a focus on “the
politics of saying and acting.”108 There are also valid concerns about
neutralizing gender and downplaying the importance of women’s
rights, “hard-won” in the world of “male privilege and women’s
oppression.”109 But is performative understanding of gender really
a threat to conventional models of political representation or human
rights advocacy?
‘punish’ them for transgressing gender barriers or for challenging predominant conceptions
of gender roles.” U.N. Gen. Assembly (Special Rapporteur of The Commission on Human
Rights) Interim Report on the Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. No. A/56/156, at 7–8 (July 3, 2001) (em-
phasis added).
101. Emilia L. Lombardi, Rikki Anne Wilchins, Dana Priesing & Diana Malouf, Gender
Violence, Transgender Experiences with Violence and Discrimination, 42 J. HOMOSEX-
UALITY 89, 100 (2008).
102. H.R.C., Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar, supra note 31, ¶ 156;
H.R.C., “I Lost My Dignity,” supra note 31, at 11.
103. Monro, supra note 96, at 3.
104. Id.
105. BUTLER, supra note 86, at 142.




109. Jeanne Ward, It’s Not About the Gender Binary, It’s about the Gender Hierarchy:
a Reply to “Letting Go of the Gender Binary,” 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 275, 282 (2016),
in response to Chris Dolan, Letting Go of the Gender Binary: Charting New Pathways
for Humanitarian Interventions on Gender-Based Violence, 96 INT’L REV.RED CROSS 485
(2014); see also Dolan’s response in Chris Dolan, Inclusive Gender: Why Tackling Gender
Hierarchies Cannot Be at the Expense of Human Rights and the Humanitarian Impera-
tive, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 625, 626–34 (2016).
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First, performative gender theory is not an arbitrary imposition
of how people must feel about their sex or gender. On a subjective,
individual level, people can have a perception of their gender as an
essence, not a performance.110 Yet on a societal level, deconstructing
the idea of gender can be beneficial to vulnerable stakeholders, who
remain invisible and unprotected in the strict binary system.
Second, a performative understanding of gender, fortunately or
unfortunately, does not lead to a complete transformation of politi-
cal systems. It does not take away the possibility of people, as par-
ticipants of democracy, to unite around more “traditional” gender
identities to achieve a specific political goal. It may, in fact, be more
effective under the status quo to advocate for policy change under a
well-established political label. In the author’s view, the trend of
moving to a “post-binary”111 society can coexist with current repre-
sentation models, at least in the transition period. While Butler’s
scenario, whereby “a new configuration of politics would surely emerge
from the ruins of the old,”112 is possible and even desirable, univer-
sal acceptance of gender beyond the binary remains an aspiration.
However, it is natural for “terminology that constitutes feminist
politics [to constantly overturn and reorganize] what counts as a
feminist subject.”113 Embracing the post-binary should not be seen
as a threat to feminist and human rights discourse, but be inte-
grated as part of their constantly evolving agenda.114
110. Mere Abrams, Gender Essentialism Is Flawed—Here’s Why, HEALTHLINE (Jan. 27,
2020), https://www.healthline.com/health/gender-essentialism#definition [https://perma
.cc/R2WC-3V44]. This perception will never be true for all.
111. KERRY O’HALLORAN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 18 (2020).
112. BUTLER, supra note 86, at 149.
113. THEBLOOMSBURYHANDBOOK OF 21ST-CENTURYFEMINIST THEORY, supra note 93,
at 4; see also ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 186 (1988) (“I am not saying that we ought never to think about or
refer to women ‘as women’ and men ‘as men’ I am only insisting that whenever we do,
that we remember which women and which men we are thinking about.”).
114. Note that whenever violence and discrimination on the basis of gender are dis-
cussed in feminist or human rights discourse it is important to follow an intersectional
approach. Discrimination based on gender overlaps with discrimination based on religion,
race, class, ethnicity, migrant status, age, disability, sexual orientation, etc. People asso-
ciate themselves with multiple social signifiers simultaneously—some immutable and
some acquired—and it is often the combination of those signifiers that makes them
targets of discrimination and violence.
The term “intersectionality” was coined by American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw
to address the legal system’s failure to address the overlapping discrimination of Black
women based on both their race and gender. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHIC. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989). Butler
later reflected on the idea that “gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and
regional modalities of discursively constituted identities.” BUTLER, supra note 86, at 3.
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II. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF REGULATING GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Inclusivity
There is no single universally accepted definition of gender-based
violence in international human rights law. It is not imperative that
an exhaustive definition is even given, in order to accommodate for
the term’s potential evolution. However, it is in the interests of the
international community that there is at least a coherent under-
standing of what constitutes gender-based violence and who may fall
victim to it. In the absence of such understanding, states are left
with a dangerously wide discretion in choosing what to include and
exclude from the notion of gender-based violence. This risk may mani-
fest in excluding115 certain gender identities (notably transgender
and nonbinary people) from the benefits of human rights protection.
While CEDAW is known for pioneering the values of gender
equality in international law, the word “violence” does not once ap-
pear in the Convention. The plain language of the Convention con-
centrates on a broader category of discrimination. To remedy that
lacunae, the CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation
No. 19 clarified that discrimination in the meaning of the Conven-
tion also covers gender-based violence, defined as “violence that is
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects
women disproportionately.”116 The logical fallacy of that definition is
that it equates gender-based violence with violence against women,
even though the former is a wider category applicable to more than
one gender.
Later attempts to make the prohibition of gender-based violence
a binding obligation, by developing a separate additional protocol to
CEDAW or drafting a subject-specific treaty were unsuccessful.117
More recent scholarship of American academic Mary Romero likewise embodies the idea
that “without considering age, class, race, ableness, and sexual orientation as social
identities, gender exists as an empty signifier.” MARY ROMERO, INTRODUCING INTERSEC-
TIONALITY 98 (2017); see also Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences), Sixty-Sixth Session on Multiple and Intersecting
forms of Discrimination and Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/17/26, ¶ 3
(Oct. 10, 2011).
115. At least, making it unclear whether they can expect the same degree of pro-
tection, if confronted with violence.
116. U.N., Gen. Rec. No. 19, Violence Against Women, CEDAW, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, at 1
(Jan. 29, 1992) [hereinafter U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 19].
117. See Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes
and Consequences), Twenty Years of Developments to Combat Violence Against Women,
¶ 10 (May 28, 2014).
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The compromise was achieved in the Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence against Women [hereinafter DEVAW].118 Article 1 of the
Declaration states that “violence against women” means “any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physi-
cal, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty,
whether occurring in public or in private life.”119 While the Declara-
tion remains a nonbinding instrument, it has been instrumental in
bringing gender-based violence against women into the spotlight.120
Notably, it paved the way to the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, which referenced the DEVAW definition of violence
against women and extended it to include violence committed in
armed conflict.121 DEVAW and Beijing forged a definition of violence
against women somewhat more inclusively, suggesting that violence
against women is one of the forms of gender-based violence, but not
the only one.122
Twenty-five years after the adoption of General Recommenda-
tion No. 19, the CEDAW Committee once again addressed the notion
of gender-based violence in its General Recommendation No. 35.123 In
this recommendation, the Committee chose to use the more precise124
phrase “gender-based violence against women” to highlight the
gendered causes and impacts of such violence.125 Importantly, the
Committee mentioned that women face “varying and intersecting
It has been argued that an optional protocol or a new convention on violence
against women should be viewed as long-term measures to be implemented
if the General Recommendations of CEDAW, the Declaration and the Special
Rapporteur proved ineffective. Others have argued that the Declaration, as
opposed to a convention on the elimination of violence against women, was
adopted because of fears of confusion between the scope of the CEDAW and
a new binding treaty on violence against women; fears that a new binding
instrument might run the risk of limited ratification; and also because of
concerns about the expense of implementing a new binding instrument.
Id. (emphasis added).
118. U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, art. 1.
119. Id.
120. Global norms and standards: Ending violence against women, UN WOMEN,
https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/global-norms
-and-standards [https://perma.cc/3VVZ-NFZU].
121. Beijing Decl. & Platform for Action, Rep. of the Fourth World Conf. on Women,
U.N. Doc. A/C.177/20, ¶¶ 113(a)–(c), 114 (1995).
122. See U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, art. 1; Beijing Decl. & Platform for Action,
supra note 121, ¶¶ 113(a)–(c), 114.
123. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 9.
124. The author considers it more precise because, while choosing to concentrate on
the category of women, it does not preclude the interpretation of gender-based violence
as a broader concept, affecting more than one gender.
125. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 9.
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forms of discrimination,” which can be enhanced by other factors—
inter alia, by being lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or intersex.126
Lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons were men-
tioned by the CEDAW Committee again in General Recommendation
No. 36 on the right of girls and women to education, in line with the
initiative of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Com-
mission.127 The Committee specifically called upon states parties to
“address discrimination against [lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex] girls and women by ensuring policies are in place to address
the obstacles that impede their access to education.”128 The Recom-
mendation also identified limited education and cultural taboos as
factors that increase the vulnerability of lesbian, bisexual, trans-
gender, and intersex students to violence.129 Although the Recom-
mendation was dedicated to questions of education and not violence
per se, it made an important nexus between the two. By expressly
stating that gender-based violence happens to people of diverse gen-
ders and sexual orientations, it took a crucial step towards making
the CEDAW framework more inclusive.130
Another example of understanding gender-based violence in-
clusively is the Violence and Harassment Convention signed under the
auspices of the International Labor Organization.131 It explicitly de-
couples “sex” and “gender” categories, defining “gender-based violence
and harassment” as “violence and harassment directed at persons
because of their sex or gender, or affecting persons of a particular sex
or gender disproportionately.”132 In the preamble, it also notes the
disproportionate impact gender-based violence and harassment
have on women and girls, and recognizes that “an inclusive, inte-
grated and gender-responsive approach, which tackles underlying
causes and risk factors, including gender stereotypes, multiple and
intersecting forms of discrimination, and unequal gender-based
power relations” is essential to ending violence.133 The Convention
126. Id. ¶ 12.
127. Id. ¶ 45; INT’L GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, WHY SEXUAL ORIENT-
ATION AND GENDER IDENTITY MUST BE SPECIFICALLY REFERENCED IN THE FORTHCOMING
CEDAW GENERAL RECOMMENDATION ON GIRLS’ AND WOMEN’S ACCESS TO EDUCATION 8
(2014), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/WomensRightEducation
/IGLHRCContribution.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL5P-9R9D].
128. U.N., Gen. Rec. No. 36, On the Right of Girls and Women to Education, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/GC/36, ¶ 46(I) (Nov. 16, 2017) [hereinafter U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 36].
129. Id. ¶ 45.
130. See id. ¶¶ 65–66, 69(a)–(I).
131. Conv. Concerning the Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of
Work, adopted by the International Labor Organization June 21, 2019, 58 I.L.M. 1170
pmbl.
132. Id. art. 1(1)(b).
133. Id. pmbl.
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adopting a gender-inclusive approach to the problems of workplace
violence and harassment has so far been ratified by only two states—
Fiji and Uruguay—making it sufficient to formally enter into force,134
but hardly impactful enough to reflect wide state consensus.
Regional human rights instruments largely use binary language
when addressing violence.135 For example, the Convention of Belém do
Pará and the Maputo Protocol use the term “violence against women”
in their operative clauses.136
However, the Istanbul Convention, while concentrating on
women’s rights, does not equate all gender-based violence to violence
against women as a definitional matter.137 Similarly to General Rec-
ommendation No. 35 of the CEDAW Committee, it uses the phrase
“gender-based violence against women,”138 and explains the docu-
ment’s chosen focus on women in the preamble, stating that “women
and girls are exposed to a higher risk of gender-based violence than
men.”139 Moreover, Article 4, paragraph 3 of the Istanbul Convention
requests state parties to implement all measures in the Convention
without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender
identity.140 This provision is interpreted in the Explanatory Report
to the Istanbul Convention to mean that “groups of persons that do
not correspond to what society has established as belonging to ‘male’
or ‘female’ categories” are covered by the nondiscrimination
clause.141 This clarification is crucial. It arguably makes the Istan-
bul Convention the most inclusive instrument designed to combat
gender-based violence.
However, the language of the Explanatory Report allows states
parties significant discretion in affording protection to gender-
diverse persons under the Istanbul Convention.142 Namely, it states
that “when ensuring that a gender-sensitive interpretation is given
to each of the convention grounds, Parties may if they wish, extend
134. Id. art. 14(2).
135. See, e.g., Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20, pmbl.; Maputo Protocol, supra
note 20.
136. Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20, pmbl.; Maputo Protocol, supra note 20.
137. Istanbul Conv., supra note 20, art. 3(d).
138. Id.
139. Id. pmbl.; see also RONAGH. J. A. MCQUIGG, THE ISTANBUL CONVENTION, DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 52, 56 (2017) (highlighting the considerations of the
European Committee on Crime Problems feasibility study regarding a convention on
domestic violence, preceding the adoption of the Istanbul Convention) (“Even though the
majority of victims are women, a convention would preferably use gender-neutral
terminology. That would not preclude a gender-based analysis of the underlying problem,
nor a gender-sensitive implementation of the convention.”).
140. Istanbul Conv., supra note 20, art. 4(3).
141. Explanatory Rep. to the Istanbul Conv., ¶ 53, C.E.T.S. No. 210 (Nov. 5, 2011).
142. Id. ¶¶ 85, 162, 214, 278.
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the interpretation to individuals who are gay, lesbian, bisexual or
transgender, who may also face particular forms of gender-related
persecution and violence.”143 The access of gender-diverse persons to
the Istanbul Convention’s guarantees through the nondiscrimination
clause may be the best mechanism developed so far, but it is not ideal.
Although the understanding of gender has evolved,144 gender-
based violence is mostly addressed by women-specific human rights
instruments.145 The prevalent approach of such instruments is to
focus on the category of women, while acknowledging the potentially
wider interpretation of gender-based violence.146 This is a thoughtful
strategy that can accommodate for future developments of interna-
tional human rights law, while still concentrating on a particularly
affected group.
While the chosen focus on women is lawful and fully justified by
historic oppression, it does not prevent human rights instruments
from confronting gender dilemmas in the future. These documents
will sooner or later be challenged to address issues that were not
initially part of their “comfort zone” and they will need to respond.
For instance, can a transgender woman147 seek protection under
CEDAW or regional instruments? Can every transgender woman
seek such protection or is this right limited to transgender women
who have surgically transitioned and acquired documents indicating
their sex as female? How about male-to-female transgender persons
who are in the process of transition? How about those who do not
ever wish to undergo surgical or medical transition? How about trans-
gender men who retain female physical features and are attacked
because the aggressors perceive them as women?
In 1993 Tyra Hunter, a transgender woman from Washington,
D.C., died of injuries she suffered in a car accident after emergency
personnel refused to treat her when they discovered that she was
anatomically male.148 In 1999 Brandon Teena, a transgender man
from Nebraska, who had not undergone male-to-female surgery, was
raped and murdered by his acquaintances who found out that he
was anatomically female.149 Whether or not similarly situated
143. Id. ¶ 313 (emphasis added).
144. See discussion supra Part I.
145. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶¶ 9–10.
146. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 109, at 278.
147. Note that the term “transgender woman” is used here for the purposes of dis-
tinguishing it from the term “cisgender woman.” Persons who technically “qualify” as
“transgender women” can, in fact, identify as just “women” and may not use the word
“trans” when referring to themselves.
148. TEICH, supra note 97, at 100.
149. Id.
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persons could count on CEDAW or regional instruments’ protection
remains an open question.
More recently, in the summer of 2020 the transfemicides of Tony
McDade, Nina Pop, Dominique Fells, and Riah Milton may have been
a less visible, yet a crucial part of Black Lives Matter protests.150
The trans-exclusionary approach to feminism recently exhibited by
famous writer Joanne Rowling in her work and on her social media
platforms was severely criticized by the trans community and its
allies.151 The Bostock v. Clayton County case of the Supreme Court
of the United States decided in 2020 has brought attention to the
problems of gender-based discrimination in the workplace.152 The
need to address gender-based violence against gender-variant in-
dividuals is evident and the cases reaching national and interna-
tional judicial and quasi-judicial platforms will only increase.
In 2018, the case of transgender activist Vicky Hernández was
heard before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and
presented to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, pending
judgement.153 The Commission’s report involves analysis on the
application of the Convention of Belém do Pará to transgender
persons.154 It states that the Commission “has already taken into
account considerations made at the international level that violence
against LGBT155 persons ‘constitute[s] a form of gender-based violence,
driven by a desire to punish those seen as defying gender norms.’”156
The Commission ultimately concluded that there had been a violation
of Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará,157 effectively extend-
ing the protection from violence to transgender women. This pro-
nouncement remains nonbinding, but if the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights adopts the Commission’s approach, this interpre-
tation would be given more authoritative weight.
150. Isabella Grullón Paz & Maggie Astor, Black Trans Women Seek More Space in
the Movement They Helped Start, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/27/us/politics/black-trans-lives-matter.html [https://perma.cc/627W-D45C];
Elliott Kozuch, HRC Mourns Nina Pop, Black Trans Woman Killed in Missouri, HUM.
RTS. CAMPAIGN (May 5, 2020), https://www.hrc.org/news/hrc-mourns-nina-pop-black
-transgender-woman-killed-in-missouri [https://perma.cc/E2GB-ZSJH].
151. Lianne Kolirin, JK Rowling’s New Book Sparks Fresh Transgender Rights Row,
CNN (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/15/entertainment/jk-rowling-troubled
-blood-book-trans-gbr-scli-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/7MSQ-VCK7].
152. 590 U.S. 1731, 1737 (2020).
153. Vicky Hernández and Family, Honduras, Case 13.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Rep. No. 157/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170, doc. 179 (2018).
154. Id. ¶¶ 46–88.
155. Unless used as part of quoted direct speech, throughout the Article the terms
“LGBTQ+” or “LGBTQIA+” will be used.
156. Vicky Hernández and Family, Honduras, Case 13.051, ¶ 60 (emphasis added).
157. Id. ¶ 101.
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The United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, exten-
sively cited by the parties in The Gambia v. Myanmar case before
the International Court of Justice to illustrate claims of genocide,
uniquely addresses transgender violence (alongside violence against
women and girls and men and boys) in its report.158 Rape and gang
rape, genital mutilation, forced nudity, and other forms of sexual vio-
lence, sometimes leading to death, were used to humiliate women,159
publicly emasculate men,160 and cause double victimization of trans-
gender persons.161 The Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic does not tackle violence against
transgender persons, but concludes that ISIL violence against women,
girls and “sexual minorities” violates international humanitarian and
human rights law.162 It also describes violence perpetrated against
men and boys.163 The documented atrocities in Myanmar and Syria
were exacerbated by militarized settings and the intersections of
gender, sexual identity, ethnicity, and religion of victims.164
A useful critique of the binary approach was provided by legal
scholar Darren Rosenblum in his article Unsex CEDAW.165 He argues
that CEDAW’s focus on women “serves to reinforce the very binary
that must be dismantled to achieve change.”166 He criticizes CEDAW
for using an identarian term as a universal descriptor.167 Acknowl-
edging that the “biologically driven clarity” of the term “women”
must have been appealing for CEDAW drafters because it could be
accepted by a wide range of states,168 he observes that such framing
left transgender and intersex persons169 “in the difficult position of
questionable international law subjectivity,”170 while further en-
trenching the idea of womanhood as victimhood.171
While Rosenblum’s concerns are relevant, there are possible
ways to address the inclusivity critique without rewriting CEDAW.
158. H.R.C., Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar, supra note 31. Note that
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights merely made a recommendation based off
of the Commission’s findings, with no indication that it was adopting the Commission’s
approach.
159. Id. ¶ 118.
160. Id. ¶¶ 154, 171.
161. Id. ¶ 180.
162. H.R.C., “I Lost My Dignity,” supra note 31, ¶¶ 103–13 (emphasis added).
163. Id. ¶¶ 43–50.
164. Id. ¶¶ 43–50.
165. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong With Women’s Rights, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 103–05 (2011).
166. Id. at 104.
167. Id. at 134.
168. Id. at 106.
169. The critique is equally applicable to nonbinary/gender nonconforming persons.
170. Rosenblum, supra note 165, at 175.
171. Id. at 167–68.
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For instance, one could argue, based on the evolutionary interpreta-
tion of treaties, that the notion of “women” in women-specific instru-
ments has grown to include transgender women and/or transgender
men.172 It is also possible to claim that, even though transgender
and nonbinary people may not be direct beneficiaries of women’s
rights protection regimes, they may seek protection against violence
in nondiscrimination clauses of the two human rights covenants,173
or in specialized instruments—inter alia, the Yogyakarta Principles
2007 and 2017, which are themselves nonbinding, but profess to
“affirm binding international legal standards with which all states
must comply.”174
The Yogyakarta Principles 2017 address four grounds for dis-
crimination: gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics,
and sexual orientation.175 The first three of these grounds refer to
the elements of gender,176 and the fourth deals with sexual orientation,
i.e., “one’s romantic and sexual attraction to others.”177 While sexual
orientation and gender identity remain two distinct notions,178 the
concept of addressing them jointly (but separately from women’s
rights) perhaps stems from the way the underpinning rights have
been politically advocated.179 Women’s rights have been spearheaded
172. See Violence against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Persons in the
Americas, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OAS/Ser.L/V/II.rev.1, Doc. 36 ¶ 52 (2015).
IACHR notes that sexual orientation and gender identity are not expressly
included in the Convention of Belém do Pará. However, the IACHR is of the
view that the Convention of Belém do Pará is a ‘living instrument.’ Thus, the
Commission considers that when Article 9 of the Convention of Belém do
Pará speaks of the state obligation to take special account of factors of special
vulnerability to violence, listing certain examples ‘among others,’ these other
factors would necessarily include sexual orientation and gender identity.
Id.
173. ICCPR, supra note 15; ICESCR, supra note 15.
174. The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 28, pmbl.
175. The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10, supra note 29, pmbl.
176. See discussion supra Part I.
177. TEICH, supra note 97, at 14.
178. See H.R.C., Rep. of the Independent Expert, supra note 36, ¶ 2 (“Sexual orien-
tation has an external dimension—it indicates a person’s sexual inclination and feelings
towards others. Gender identity has an internal dimension—the term refers to how a
person self-identifies in regard to his or her own gender, which may be different from the
gender assigned at birth.”).
179. See O’HALLORAN, supra note 111, at 13.
An identity is the particular aggregate of constituents, or their configuration,
that distinguishes an entity from all others. Once identified, an entity then
becomes amenable to classification, which in turn means it can be ascribed
a status or be rank-ordered relative to other entities. In effect, identification
leads to determining the significance of an entity and its worth; this estab-
lishes its value or perhaps power in relation to its context. Not until it
acquires or is ascribed an identity can an entity be recognized in law and
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by the feminist movement(s), often conventionally centered around
the “women/men” dialectic.180 While LGBTQIA+ is perceived by some
as a form of political unity,181 akin to the feminist movement,182 the
dialectic of its struggle is a lot less clear. At the very least, it combines
the “gay/straight” dialectic of L, G, B; the “transgender/cisgender”
of T; the “biologically concordant/non-concordant” of I; the “sexual/
nonsexual” of A; and the “normative/non-normative” of Q.183 Cer-
tainly, all of these groups are attacked for similar patriarchal “rea-
sons” and it is practical to address the intersections holistically. Yet
women are also attacked because of patriarchy.184 While LGBTQIA+
unites both gender and sexual orientation signifiers under the same
umbrella, resulting in documents like the Yogyakarta Principles,
women’s rights occupy a distinct political platform and are typically
addressed in women-specific instruments.185 In fact, when criticizing
the CEDAW binary language, Rosenblum commended a more inclu-
sive framework of the Yogyakarta Principles.186
Having noted the peculiarities of the Yogyakarta Principles’
inclusive “design,” their substantive provisions on gender-based vio-
lence must be analyzed. Without giving gender-based violence a
definition per se, the Yogyakarta Principles recognize the existence
of violence based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender
expression, and sex characteristics187 and refer to the obligation to
then deemed to be vested with a ‘legal personality’ with rights and duties
that can be the subject of legal proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added).
180. See, e.g., Quinn Crossley, Uplifting Diverse Genders: Beyond “Women and Non-
Binary,” MEDIUM (Mar. 2, 2019), https://medium.com/@quinncrossley/uplifting-diverse
-genders-beyond-women-and-non-binary-916c890f2185 [https://perma.cc/LQ49-RWDS].
181. O’HALLORAN, supra note 111, at 15 (“[The term ‘LGBT community’] is admittedly
inadequate but has come to be accepted as a form of shorthand to identify those
perceived to fall outside rigid binary sex and gender norms.”).
182. Perception of feminism as a single and homogeneous political movement is,
likewise, questionable. It is not uncommon to refer to “feminisms” to reflect the variety
of feminist philosophies and movements.
183. Gender-queerness can be experienced differently, but it generally opposes the need
for self-labeling in matters of gender and sexual orientation. See O’HALLORAN, supra note
111, at 20 (citing DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY,
62 (1997)) (“Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate,
the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. It is an iden-
tity without an essence. ‘Queer’ then, demarcates not a positivity but a positionality vis-
à-vis the normative.”).
184. H.R.C., “The Time to Act Is Now”—UN Experts Urge Men and Boys to Become
Women’s Rights Defenders 1, 2 (2020).
185. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶¶ 9–10.
186. Rosenblum, supra note 165, at 106, 162, 166. Rosenblum also argues that both
the Yogyakarta Principles and CERD are more inclusive because of their right-based
character, as contrasted with CEDAW identity-centered approach. Id. at 166.
187. The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 28, pmbl.
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combat violence multiple times.188 This framing helps expand the
understanding of gender-based violence to account for the experi-
ences of gender-diverse people.
Inclusivity is important. Representatives of different gender
identities should not feel like they have a lesser claim to human rights
protection from violence, than those whose identity is more “conven-
tional” (and, therefore, perceived as more real or more valid). Ac-
cording to the data of Transrespect versus Transphobia Worldwide,
2300 transgender persons are known to have been killed in the last
decade in dozens of countries.189 According to the Human Rights
Campaign Foundation, forty-seven percent of transgender people
have been sexually assaulted, while often being “left out of convers-
ations surrounding intimate partner violence and sexual assault.”190
The focus on women reflected in CEDAW, DEVAW, and regional
human rights instruments is understandable, well-meant, and hard-
won.191 The author does not wish to disregard the painstaking
struggle against historic male oppression that lies at the heart of
these documents. Nor does she wish to dispute the fact that a large
number of gender-based violence survivors are indeed cisgender
women attacked by cisgender men. While these experiences are not to
be neglected, they should not justify trans-exclusionary approaches192
to gender-based violence.
Standing definitions of gender-based violence are not hopelessly
exclusionary and there is some leeway for an “evolutionary interpreta-
tion” argument.193 However, most human rights instruments dealing
188. Id. principles 33(F), 36, 37(A), 9(H), 17(J), 23(E), 24(H), 25(D).
189. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., DISMANTLING A CULTURE OF VIOLENCE: UNDER-
STANDING ANTI-TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE AND ENDING THE CRISIS, 1, 14 (2018).
190. Id.
191. Similar logic is applicable in the humanitarian context. See Ward, supra note 109,
at 282.
192. On the notion of trans-exclusionary radical feminism (TERF), see THE BLOOMS-
BURY HANDBOOK OF 21ST-CENTURY FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 93, at 149; see also
Robin Dembroff, Trans Women Are Victims of Misogyny, Too—and All Feminists Must
Recognize This, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2019/may/19/valerie-jackson-trans-women-misogyny-feminism [https://perma.cc
/J4VQ-D5Y7]; Emi Koyama, The Transfeminist Manifesto, in CATCHING A WAVE: RE-
CLAIMING FEMINISM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 245, 248 (Rory Dicker & Alison
Piepmeier eds., 2003).
193. For an optimistic view on potentially extending existing definitions, see:
While the UN definitions both refer specifically to women, they also allow
for a wider definition of gender which could be extended to vulnerable males,
even though the majority of, or a disproportionate number of victims are
indeed still female. This approach takes into account social constructions of
masculinity and femininity and allows for examination of broader issues of
sexuality, including protection of rights in relation to freedom of sexual
orientation, which are still highly under-developed in international human
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with gender-based violence default to the binary.194 This illustrates
an identity divide between “traditional” and “nontraditional.” Women
whose sex, gender identity, and expression are a perfect cisgender
fit are welcome to seek protection as women. Women who are less
gender concordant are encouraged to seek protection as LGBTQIA+,
not as women. This approach, especially in the absence of binding
LGBTQIA+ specific instruments to counterbalance women-specific
ones, fragments and weakens international human rights responses
to gender-based violence, which strikes without acknowledging the
peculiarities of legal frameworks.
Developing strategic jurisprudence (Vicky Hernández and Family
v. Honduras), adopting inclusive interpretations of gender-based
violence (CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 36), and
using nondiscrimination clauses of women-specific instruments are
the crucial first steps of extending human rights guarantees beyond
the binary, but more remains to be done. In the fight against gender-
based violence, there needs to be solidarity across genders and orienta-
tions. Whether it is achieved through more inclusive interpretations
of existing texts or through negotiating new, more inclusive ones, it
is desirable that international human rights law promotes solidar-
ity, not otherness.
B. Patriarchy
On International Women’s Day 2020, a group of 77 United Na-
tions experts made a joint statement urging states and private actors
to “ensure systematic changes to patriarchal power structures, so-
cial norms, gender stereotypes and hostile environments.”195 The call
to dismantle patriarchy can only be acted upon once its overarching
nature, the ways it is ingrained in cultural practices, and the ways
it manifests in gender-based violence are understood.196
When womanhood and manhood are socially constructed, they
are constructed based on certain rules.197 There is an unspoken script
rights law. The terminology around gender-based violence, as opposed to
that of violence against women or sex discrimination, highlights the rele-
vance of multiple power hierarchies which can victimize both men and women
in a variety of contexts.
Ilias Bantekas & Lutz Oette, The Human Rights of Women, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 534–35 (3d ed. 2020) (emphasis added).
194. See, e.g., Explanatory Rep. to the Istanbul Conv., supra note 141, ¶¶ 1, 45.
195. Off. of High Comm’ner, U.N. Human Rights, International Women’s Day
Statement from United Nations Human Rights Experts (Mar. 6, 2020) [hereinafter
International Women’s Day Statement].
196. Id.
197. See REBECCAJ.COOK&SIMONECUSACK, GENDERSTEREOTYPING:TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (2010).
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in a play of womanhood and manhood, in which the leading actor is
a man and the supporting actress is a woman.198 The way people are
supposed to perform these two (and only two) gender roles is deter-
mined by patriarchy.199
Feminist scholar bell hooks200 describes patriarchy as “the dy-
namic between those qualities deemed ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ in
which half of our human traits are exalted while the other half is
devalued.”201 She calls patriarchy a “tortured value system,” in which
both men and women participate.202 Historian Merry Wiesner-Hanks
defines patriarchy as a “social system in which men have more
power and access to resources than women of the same group, and
in which men are privileged over other men.”203
In their book Why Does Patriarchy Persist?, Carol Gilligan and
Naomi Snider define patriarchy as a culture based on a gender binary
and hierarchy, a framework or lens that (1) leads us to see human
capacities as either “masculine” or “feminine” and to privilege the
masculine, (2) elevates some men over other men and all men over
women, (3) forces a split between the self and relationships so that
in effect men have selves, whereas women ideally are selfless, and
women have relationships, which surreptitiously serve men’s needs.204
In their view, “gender binary and hierarchy” are key elements of
maintaining patriarchal order.205
Patriarchy is a crucial force in constructing socially acceptable
gender roles.206 An extension of this power to define manhood and
womanhood is the power to dictate who men and women are supposed
to be attracted to. Heteronormativity is as important part of patriarchy
as male superiority.207 Not only does patriarchy negatively affect
women as an “inferior” gender, it affects everyone who is gender- or
sexually “mismatched.”208 When a cisgender woman demands equal
198. See id.
199. See BELL HOOKS,THEWILL TO CHANGE:MEN,MASCULINITY, AND LOVE19–20 (2004).
200. Lowercase intended.
201. See HOOKS, supra note 199, at 32–33; see also CLEMENTINE FORD, BOYS WILL BE
BOYS: POWER, PATRIARCHY AND TOXIC MASCULINITY 8–9 (2019).
202. HOOKS, supra note 199, at 33.
203. MERRY E. WIESNER-HANKS, WOMEN AND GENDER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 325
(4th ed. 2019).
204. CAROL GILLIGAN & NAOMI SNIDER, WHY DOES PATRIARCHY PERSIST? 6 (2018).
205. Id. at 135–36.
206. HOOKS, supra note 199, at 19–20.
207. See Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences) on its Fifty-eighth session, Cultural practices in the family
that constitute violence towards women, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/83 (Jan. 31, 2002) (“[N]on-
heterosexual orientations are also punished severely. . . . [I]n Zimbabwe, a young lesbian
woman was locked up by her family and forced to submit to rape by an older man to
‘correct’ her orientation. She was raped until she became pregnant.”) (emphasis added).
208. See COOK & CUSACK, supra note 197, at 33.
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division of household chores—she is mismatched, because women are
supposed to be housekeepers.209 When a cisgender woman is at-
tracted to women—she is mismatched, because she is supposed to
like men. When a cisgender man earns less than his wife—he is mis-
matched, because men are supposed to be breadwinners.210 When a
cisgender man is attracted to men—he is mismatched, because he
is supposed to like women. Transgender people are a mismatch by
default. This immediate intersection of gender and sexual orienta-
tion is at the heart of patriarchy.211
Patriarchy is a necessary ideological foundation of a gender-
unequal society. It legitimizes the superiority of men over women.
It manifests in laws, policies, family relations, cultural practices, and
media representations. It disapproves of and sanctions nonconformity.
It provides a moral, essentialist justification to harmful practices.
When women and gender-diverse persons are underrepresented in
governmental institutions, patriarchy provides a rationale for it—
there is just something inexplicably but fundamentally manly about
a political career. When rape culture212 persists, it rests on a patri-
archal belief that rape can be “provoked”213 by inappropriate behav-
iors. Such prejudices generate disrespect and devaluation of “gender
inferior” persons in all sectors of society.214 Failure to recognize and
eliminate patriarchal prejudices and stereotypes exacerbates a
climate of impunity with respect to violations of human rights.215
A patriarchal definition of “masculinity” often “involves a toler-
ance of violence.”216 Gender-based violence is an embodiment of
patriarchy, a manifestation of full power some men have over women
209. See id. at 22, 33.
210. See id. at 22, 33, 52.
211. Note that this intersection is important for ensuring a more inclusive human
rights approach to gender-based violence. Dismantling patriarchy is equally necessary
in eliminating violence against different persons of different genders (women, trans-
gender, nonbinary, etc.) and sexual orientations (gay, lesbian, bisexual, etc.).
212. Rape culture is understood as a set of patriarchal beliefs that justify the actions
of rapists based on a stereotype that rape can be provoked by “inappropriate” behavior
of victims. See Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Framing Sexual Violence Prevention,
in PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO OVERCOMING A
RAPECULTURE 2 (Nicola Henry & Anastasia Powell eds., 2004); ALONAHAGAY-FREY,SEX
AND GENDER CRIMES IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 33–36
(2011); SHARRATT, supra note 50, at 35–38.
213. S.T. v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 100/2016, U.N. Doc., CEDAW
/C/73/D/100/2016 ¶¶ 2.22, 5, 7.2, 9.7, 5 (Aug. 9, 2019); Karen Tayag Vertido v. The
Philippines, Communication No. 18/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 ¶¶ 3.5, 8.5,
8.6 (Sept. 1, 2010); R.P.B. v. The Philippines, Communication No. 34/2011, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 ¶¶ 8.9, 8.10 (Mar. 12, 2014).
214. COOK & CUSACK, supra note 197, at 1.
215. Id.
216. Coomaraswamy, supra note 207, ¶ 105.
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as a group, over “weaker” men, and over “queers” who do not fit into
a predetermined binary gender role.217
Human rights instruments identify a patriarchal value system
as one of the causes of gender-based violence.218 CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 35 calls upon states parties to “[a]dopt and
implement effective legislative and other appropriate preventive
measures to address the underlying causes of gender-based violence
against women, including patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes.”219
The Recommendation refers to an “erosion of legal and policy frame-
works to eliminate gender-based discrimination or violence, often
justified in the name of tradition, culture, religion or fundamentalist
ideologies” as a factor weakening state response to violence.220
Article 5(a) of CEDAW itself calls upon states,
to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.221
The Convention of Belém do Pará recognizes that “violence
against women is an offense against human dignity and a manifes-
tation of the historically unequal power relations between women
and men” and includes an obligation equivalent to one contained in
Article 5(a) of CEDAW.222
The Maputo Protocol similarly requires its states parties,
to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women
and men through public education, information, education and
communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimina-
tion of harmful cultural and traditional practices and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for
women and men.223
The Istanbul Convention recognizes violence against women as
a “manifestation of historically unequal power relations between
217. See COOK & CUSACK, supra note 197, at 1.
218. See, e.g., U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 34.
219. Id.
220. Id. ¶ 7.
221. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 5(a).
222. Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20, pmbl., art. 8(b); U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec.
No. 35, supra note 59, art. 5(a).
223. Maputo Protocol, supra note 20, art. 2.
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women and men, which have led to domination over, and discrimi-
nation against, women by men” and as “crucial social mechanisms
by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared
with men.”224 It obliges states parties to
take the necessary measures to promote changes in the social and
cultural patterns of behaviour of women and men with a view to
eradicating prejudices, customs, traditions and all other prac-
tices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women or on
stereotyped roles for women and men225
and to “ensure that culture, custom, religion, tradition or so-called
‘honour’ shall not be considered as justification for any acts of vio-
lence covered by the scope of [this] Convention.”226
As is evident from the provisions of international human rights
instruments, gender-based violence is often discussed in the context
of culture.227 It is true that violence is often normalized or tolerated
due to patriarchal cultural patterns. However, we must resist the
urge of labeling some (usually non-Western) cultures as more bar-
baric than others when it comes to gender-based violence.228 In the
Preliminary Report of the first Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, Radhika Coomaraswamy pointed
out that “there are patterns of patriarchal domination which are uni-
versal, though this domination takes a number of different forms as
a result of particular and different historical experiences.”229 This
should serve an important reminder that patriarchy is deeply rooted
in universal power structures and is not merely a local phenomenon.230
It is not cultures per se that should be a human rights subject, but
patriarchy within cultures.
American scholar Traci West in her book Solidarity and Defiant
Spirituality: Africana Lessons on Religion, Racism and Ending Gender
Violence identifies the double standard in treating gender-based
224. Istanbul Conv., supra note 20, pmbl.
225. Id. art. 12(1).
226. Id. art. 12(5).
227. See MERRY, supra note 61, at 11; U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59,
¶ 7; Beijing Decl. & Platform for Action, supra note 121, ¶ 118.
228. See Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences), Rep. on the Intersections Between Culture and Violence Against Women,
¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/34 (Jan. 17, 2007) (“[T]here has also been a tendency on the part
of some to essentialize traditional cultures of the Global South as inherently harmful to
women.” (emphasis added)).
229. Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences), Prelim. Rep., ¶ 50 (Nov. 22, 1994) (emphasis added).
230. Id.
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violence in developed and developing countries.231 She notes how
“prohibitions on gender violence among European Christians (intra-
racial violence) coexisted with the seeming cultural normalcy of their
acts of interracial sexual assault.”232 She discusses how a “boastful
identification of U.S. culture as global symbol of progress”233 contra-
dicts the fact that “routine intimate violence against African and
Native women was seamlessly woven into the history of early Ameri-
can religious and moral habits,”234 allowing a discourse of “gendered
historical amnesia.”235
The risk of portraying some cultures as inherently more harmful
than others was voiced when the problem of female genital mutila-
tion was addressed by the United Nations in the context of harmful
traditional practices.236 Some argued that the harmful traditional
practices agenda “unfortunately reinforced the notion that metropol-
itan centers of the West contain no ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’ harmful to
women”237 and that “culture is only seen as . . . a relevant factor in
violence against women in non-Western contexts, despite the exis-
tence of high rates of sexual and domestic violence in Western
states, as well as other harmful practices such as cosmetic surgery
or media portrayals of women as sexual objects.”238
Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry cautioned against homogenizing
and essentializing cultures239 in ways that allow some cultures to be
associated with civilization and some with savagery.240 She main-
tained that the complex and dynamic nature of culture is ignored
when a group’s failure to abide by human rights principles is blamed
on its “traditional culture.”241 She stated that human rights regimes
are better off critiquing “particular practices or gender stereotypes”242
instead of cultures at large. In Merry’s view, this tactic is “less likely
to evoke nationalist defenses and justifications and more likely to
build on local movements of resistance and contestation.”243
231. See TRACI C. WEST, SOLIDARITY AND DEFIANT SPIRITUALITY: AFRICANA LESSONS
ON RELIGION, RACISM AND ENDING GENDER VIOLENCE 5–6 (Anthony B. Pinn & Stacey M.
Floyd-Thomas eds., 2019).
232. Id. at 6.
233. Id. at 5.
234. Id. at 8.
235. Id. at 5.
236. Bronwyn Winter, Denise Thompson & Sheila Jeffreys, The UN Approach to
Harmful Traditional Practices, INT’L FEMINIST J. OF POL. 72, 72–94 (2002).
237. Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 33 (citing Winter et al., supra note 236).
238. Bantekas & Oette, supra note 193, at 533–34.
239. See MERRY, supra note 61, at 8.
240. Id. at 13.
241. Id. at 15.
242. Id. at 100.
243. Id.
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However, the second Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk was critical of
“culture versus cultural practices distinction,” stating that “com-
partmentalizing violence against women and neatly partitioning it
into ‘practices’ may at times also be counterproductive, if commonal-
ities and shared root causes of such practices are not identified and
integrated into a holistic strategy.”244
Merry and Ertürk, however, both reject essentializing cultures245
and share a common perspective that the potential to combat gender-
based violence can be found within cultures themselves.246 Merry
states that for universal standards “to find resonance in very di-
verse societies”247 they should be “translated into local . . . con-
texts.”248 Ertürk maintains that the human rights discourse needs
to be complemented by “cultural negotiation” as a process of draw-
ing on positive elements within culture, demonstrating that culture
is not an immutable and homogenous entity.249
Every culture is “infected” with patriarchy in one way or an-
other.250 However, the aspirations to be treated equally are also
“indigenous to every culture.”251 The challenge is to combat patriar-
chy without marginalizing cultures, never sliding into the language
of “superiority” and “inferiority,” “civilization,” and “barbarism.” Hu-
man rights regimes should avoid essentializing cultures by stating,
explicitly or implicitly, that certain cultures are wired to promote
or tolerate gender-based violence more than others. Treating cul-
tures as homogenous, static, or apolitical252 is a fatal mistake. Even
the vulnerable gender groups that are sought to be protected from
244. Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 34.
245. MERRY, supra note 61, at 8; Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 68.
246. MERRY, supra note 61, at 11; Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 85.
247. Coomaraswamy, supra note 207, ¶ 10.
248. Vijaya Nagarajan & Archana Parashar, Gender Equality in International Law
and Constitutions: Mediating Universal Norms and Local Differences, in THE PUBLIC
LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL 187 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G.
Young eds., 2016); see also MERRY, supra note 61, at 220; TONIA ST. GERMAIN & SUSAN
DEWEY, CONFLICT RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, LOCAL RESPONSES
84–86 (2012).
249. Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 52; Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences), The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool
for the Elimination of Violence Against Women ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20,
2006).
250. See Coomaraswamy, supra note 207, at 3 (“All cultures have certain practices
that deny women their rights and dignity.”).
251. Alexandra Oprea, Re-Envisioning Social Justice From the Ground Up, 2004
ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 29, 31 (July 2004) (citing UMA NARYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES:
IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS, AND THIRD WORLD FEMINISM 22 (1997)).
252. Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶¶ 58, 60, 62.
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their “inherently harmful” cultures are likely to identify with their
cultures and reject such blatant negative characterizations (espe-
cially if such characterizations are exclusively reserved for the
Global South).253
Universal human rights should not be a force of “disciplining
and punishing” local cultures for not adhering to universal standards.
For universal standards “to find resonance in . . . diverse societies”254
they should be “translated into local contexts.”255 Translation does
not mean transformation256 and does not require radical reformu-
lations of human rights instruments. It is merely an invitation for
human rights bodies to be sensitive to and informed about local
contexts, when monitoring compliance or issuing recommendations
regarding gender-based violence. In Merry’s words, when “human
rights ideas are packaged in culturally resonant wrappings, the
interior remains a radical challenge to patriarchy.”257
Abstaining from essentializing cultures does not mean reframing
gender-based violence as a mixture of sporadic and disconnected
practices, instead of a pattern. It means that there are commonalities
in gender oppression that “go beyond specific cultural boundaries.”258
The effort to combat gender-based violence is most effective when
the focus is shifted from cultures to patriarchy within cultures.259
The notion of patriarchy is not limited to specific cultural prac-
tices but embedded into power structures around the globe. Electing
women as heads of states is still largely viewed as triumphant, but
unusual. There are states that have never had a woman or a gender-
diverse person as a leader. The United Nations has never once had
253. See Coomaraswamy, supra note 207, ¶ 5:
Despite these international norms and standards, the tension between uni-
versal human rights and cultural relativism is played out in the everyday
lives of millions of women throughout the globe. The situation is made more
complex by the fact that women also identify with their culture and
are offended by the arrogant gaze of outsiders who criticize their way of
doing things.
See id. ¶ 112 (“It is often argued that the human rights approach, with its emphasis on
law and punishment, may not be very productive in fighting violence against women on
the ground.”) (emphasis added).
254. Id. ¶ 10.
255. MERRY, supra note 61, at 220.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
258. Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 72(a)(iii).
259. See Oprea, supra note 251, at 30–31 (stating in respect of essentializing Romani
culture that the “portrayal of culture as an unchanging monolith” has led to a situation
when “[p]atriarchy within Romani communities is either ignored or deemed ‘Romani
culture.’ . . . [M]any fall into the trap of ‘turning a blind eye’ to patriarchal practices,
excusing them as the others’ ‘culture’.”).
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a woman or a gender-diverse person as its Secretary-General. All
these facts mean that, in the mindset of many, manhood is still
synonymous with power. Changes constantly happen to this power
dynamic, but, even when they are welcomed, they are often perceived
as revolutionary, scandalous, radical, and unprecedented.
Gender-based violence is a product of patriarchal power relations
where men and “the masculine” is privileged over women and “the
feminine.” It is not just women who fall victim to this narrative. Be-
cause of its heteronormative character, it immediately intersects with
sexual orientation and other signifiers. The patriarchal power dynamic
is universally prevalent. Even though international human rights law
should not cease tackling violent practices that attach to certain
localities, the struggle of dismantling patriarchy should not ever be
substituted by the struggle to fix particularly dangerous cultures.
C. Normativity
The prohibition of gender-based violence was first enshrined in
nonbinding sources. CEDAW Committee General Recommendations
Nos. 19 and 35, DEVAW, and the Beijing Platform have succeeded
in gaining momentum and drawing states’ attention to the problem.
Whether a universal prohibition has emerged as a binding rule of
treaty or customary international law is still debatable.
1. Regional Instruments
While the normative value of the prohibition of gender-based
violence may still be disputed on the level of universal human rights,
no such dispute exists for countries that have ratified regional human
rights instruments, establishing said prohibition. Forty-two African
states that have ratified the Maputo Protocol, thirty-two American
states that have ratified the Convention of Belém do Pará, thirty-
three European states that have ratified the Istanbul Convention,
are bound by the obligations thereunder. All of these documents
have been revolutionary in acknowledging and responding to gender-
based violence against women.260
The Convention of Belém do Pará has significantly advanced
the interpretation of violence against women as a violation of hu-
man rights, highlighting “the deeply held patriarchal attitudes and
stereotypes relating to the social roles and responsibilities of women
260. All of the mentioned instruments, based on their ordinary textual interpretation,
are aimed at women specifically.
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and men.”261 It provides for two types of obligations: first, measures
to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women that need
to be undertaken by all appropriate means and without delay, and,
second, measures that are to be undertaken progressively.262 The
former includes, inter alia, refraining from violence;263 exercising
due diligence in preventing, investigating, and imposing penalties
for violence;264 amending domestic legislation;265 modifying cultural
practices that sustain tolerance of violence;266 introducing protective
measures for women affected.267 The latter includes, inter alia, de-
veloping educational programs to counteract gender bias;268 providing
shelters;269 introducing readjustment and training programs.270
The Maputo Protocol establishes the connection between the
right to dignity and freedom from violence271 and obliges states par-
ties, inter alia, to take appropriate and effective measures to enact and
enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against women;272 identify
the causes and consequences of violence;273 punish the perpetra-
tors;274 establish information, rehabilitation, and reparation services;275
condemn and prohibit all forms of female genital mutilation and
other harmful practices.276 In the spirit of intersectionality, it recog-
nizes especially affected groups of women who are subject to inter-
secting forms of discrimination, such as widows,277 elderly women,278
women with disabilities,279 women in distress,280 and women in
situations of armed conflict.281 As indicated by the Special Rapporteur
on violence against women, many gains have been achieved since
261. DUBRAVKA ŠIMONOVI (SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN), 25
YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE BEIJING PLATFORM FOR ACTION 23 (2020), https://www.ohchr
.org/Documents/Issues/Women/SR/Booklet_BPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/VER7-ZNZJ].
262. Id. at 22–23.
263. Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20, art. 7(a).
264. Id. art. 7(b).
265. Id. art. 7(c).
266. Id. art. 7(e).
267. Id. art. 7(f).
268. Id. art. 8(b).
269. Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20, art. 8(d).
270. Id. art. 8(f).
271. See Maputo Protocol, supra note 20, art. 3(4).
272. Id. art. 4(2)(a).
273. Id. art. 4(2)(c).
274. Id. art. 4(2)(e).
275. Id.
276. Id. art. 5.
277. See Maputo Protocol, supra note 20, art. 20.
278. Id. art. 22.
279. Id. art. 23.
280. Id. art. 24.
281. Id. art. 11.
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the adoption of the Maputo Protocol at the national level.282 The
positive changes include, inter alia, adopting and amending legisla-
tion in the areas of violence against women, female genital mutila-
tion, child marriage, sexual and reproductive health rights.283
The Istanbul Convention is the first legally binding treaty in
Europe addressing gender-based violence.284 The Istanbul Conven-
tion is renowned for the unmatched comprehensiveness of its frame-
work.285 It provides for different types of obligations: prevention;286
protection and support;287 changes in substantive law;288 investiga-
tion, prosecution, procedural law and protective measures;289 measures
related to protection and asylum;290 measures of international co-
operation;291 and data collection.292 The Istanbul Convention has
been a major force keeping gender-based violence as a priority on the
political agenda of the Council of Europe.293 Moreover, the steps taken
by the European Union to accede to the Istanbul Convention have
put violence against women on the agenda of the European Parlia-
ment, the European Council, and other bodies, calling for increased
action to end violence against women.294 “At national level, the rati-
fication of the Istanbul Convention has in many instances prompted
legislative and policy changes, sometimes leading to widespread par-
liamentary and public debate.”295
“It is generally recognized that the effectiveness of international
instruments can be[,]” inter alia, “measured by the effectiveness
of their monitoring mechanism.”296 All three regions introduced
special institutions or mandates designed to oversee the implemen-
tation of the instruments—the Committee of Experts of the Follow-up
282. See ŠIMONOVI , supra note 261, at 37.
283. Id.
284. Council of Eur. Task Force to Combat Violence against Women, including Domestic
Violence (EG-TFV), Final Activity Report, Strasbourg 21 (Sept. 2008); Background to
Project ‘Preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence in
Ukraine,’ COUNCIL OF EUR. (Sept. 2013), https://www.coe.int/en/web/stop-violence-against
-women-ukraine/about-project/background [https://perma.cc/XF79-J29P].
285. “Challenging the Istanbul Convention is a serious setback for women’s rights”:
Jelena Drenjanin, COUNCIL OF EUR. (July 31, 2020), https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/
-challenging-the-istanbul-convention-is-a-serious-setback-for-women-s-rights-jelena
-drenjanin [https://perma.cc/6PD9-ZA7Y].
286. See Istanbul Conv., supra note 20, arts. 12–17.
287. Id. arts. 18–28.
288. Id. arts. 29–48.
289. Id. arts. 49–58.
290. Id. arts. 59–61.
291. Id. arts. 62–65.
292. See Istanbul Conv., supra note 20, art. 2.
293. See ŠIMONOVI , supra note 261, at 30–31.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 31.
296. MCQUIGG, supra note 139, at 48.
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Mechanism to the Convention of Belém do Pará; the Group of Experts
on action against violence against Women and Domestic Violence
and the Committee of the Parties to the Istanbul Convention; the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Special Rappor-
teur on the rights of women in Africa.297
While the three regional human rights instruments prohibiting
gender-based violence are all binding upon the respective state parties,
the modalities of their practical application are different. For instance,
the Maputo Protocol and the Convention of Belém do Pará are di-
rectly actionable before the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights298 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, respec-
tively.299 The violations of the Istanbul Convention may not be directly
addressed before the European Court of Human Rights, the jurisdic-
tion of which is limited to claims under the European Convention on
Human Rights and its Protocols.300 However, the Istanbul Conven-
tion can be and is, in fact, cited by the European Court of Human
Rights to substantiate its analysis.301 It is also not uncommon for
the CEDAW Committee, following its communication procedure,302
to recommend that states ratify the Istanbul Convention.303
297. International Day on the Elimination of Violence against Women—25 November,
U.N.HUM.RTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’N, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages
/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20911 [https://perma.cc/43AW-FTTC].
298. The cases before the court may be brought by either the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, nongovernmental organizations, or individuals (the two
latter categories can only gain access to the court if declarations to that effect were made
by states parties to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights).
299. The cases before and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are brought by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights if the state in question failed to
adhere to the recommendations of the Commission.
300. Conv. for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended
by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, art. 32, Apr. 11, 1950, ETS No. 005.
301. See Talpis v. Italy, App. No. 41237/14 ¶¶ 58, 129 (Mar. 21, 2017), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-171994 [https://perma.cc/P3X8-A5KE]; Volodina v. Russia, App.
No. 41261/17 ¶ 60 (July 9, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194321 [https://
perma.cc/K2D3-CL8R]; Y. v. Slovenia, App. No. 41107/10 ¶ 72 (May 28, 2015), http://hu
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-154728 [https://perma.cc/BQB4-L9M8]; see also Sarah Murphy,
Domestic Violence as Sex Discrimination: Ten Years since the Seminal European Court
of Human Rights Decision in Opuz v. Turkey, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1347, 1357
(2019) (“The ECtHR makes reference to the Istanbul Convention to confirm that do-
mestic violence can constitute sex discrimination, but it rarely goes further than that.”).
302. G.A., Optional Protocol to the Conv. on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, art. 1, Oct. 15, 1999, A/RES/54/4 [hereinafter CEDAW
Optional Protocol].
303. S.L. v. Bulgaria, Communication No. 99/2016, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/73/D/99/2016
¶ 7.15(b)(iii) (Sept. 10, 2019); S.T. v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 100/2016,
U.N. Doc., CEDAW/C/73/D/100/2016 ¶ 11(b)(vi) (Aug. 9, 2019. Note that the Istanbul Con-
vention is also open for signature and ratification by nonmembers of the Council of Europe.
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The actionability of the Maputo Protocol has not significantly
increased the volume of gender-based violence cases before the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.304 So far, the court has only de-
cided one case in which it found a violation of the Maputo Protocol—
APDF and IHRDA v. Mali, which concerned discriminatory child
marriage and inheritance clauses of Malian family code.305
The Convention of Belém do Pará has been successfully invoked
before both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights306 and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights307 several times. The
violations of the Convention of Belém do Pará often entailed very
detailed state obligations, such as erecting a “monument in memory
of the women victims of gender-based murders[,]”308 creating a “web
page with the necessary personal information on all the women and
girls who have disappeared . . . and who remain missing[,]”309 pro-
viding “appropriate and effective medical, psychological or psychiatric
treatment, immediately and free of charge.”310
Even though the implementation of the three regional treaties
may differ in effectiveness, the treaties are not thereby stripped of
their normative value. However, the varying modalities of their appli-
cation illustrate that even a violation of a binding treaty obligation
can be difficult to remedy in practice.
304. Alice Banens, African Court issues its first judgment on women’s rights, INTLAW-
GRRLS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://ilg2.org/2018/09/13/african-court-issues-its-first-judg
ment-on-womens-rights [https://perma.cc/2YJ9-2F9M].
305. ACtHPR, APDF and IHRDA v. Mali, App. No. 046/2016, African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 28–29 (May 11, 2018).
306. See Vicky Hernández and Family, Honduras, Case 13.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Rep. No. 157/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170, doc. 179 ¶¶ 80, 98 (2018); Maria Da Penha Maia
Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V
/II.111, doc. 20 ¶ 4 (2000); Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al., United States, Merits, Case
12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. 80/11 ¶ 124 (2011); Indravani Pamela
Ramjattan, Trinidad and Tobago, Case 11.837, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rep. No. 31/14,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.150, doc. 35 ¶¶ 3–4 (2014).
307. Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 ¶¶ 6, 31, 58, 64, 394, 400–02, 542
(Nov. 16, 2009); see also “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211 ¶¶ 54, 140–41 (Nov. 24,
2009); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160 ¶¶ 12, 31 (Nov. 25, 2006).
308. Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 17; “Las Dos Erres” Massacre,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211, ¶ 15; Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, ¶ 16.
309. Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 20; “Las Dos Erres” Massacre,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211, ¶ 17.
310. Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 24; “Las Dos Erres” Massacre,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211, ¶ 16; Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, ¶ 13.4.
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2. Universal Instruments
The existence of three binding regional instruments prohibiting
gender-based violence does not discharge one from the duty to analyze
whether the same prohibition exists on a universal level. One of the
possible scenarios is that the prohibition of gender-based violence
has emerged as a rule of treaty law—in the process of interpreting
CEDAW through DEVAW and CEDAW Committee’s recommenda-
tions. Another scenario is one where the prohibition of gender-based
violence has emerged as a rule of customary law—in the process of
forming state practice and opinio juris.
CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 19, which
arguably incorporated the prohibition of gender-based violence to
CEDAW, did not clearly situate gender-based violence as a legal rule
within the Convention’s framework.311 The Committee stated that
“[g]ender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Con-
vention regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention
violence.”312 The Committee, therefore, suggested that gender-based vi-
olence was a “means” of violating existing CEDAW provisions without
formulating a distinct right to be free from gender-based violence.313
DEVAW, adopted a year after the General Recommendation No.
19, preserves the Committee’s logic that gender-based violence can
serve as a means of depriving women of other substantive human
rights.314 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 35 deals
with the prohibition of gender-based violence in more detail, stating
that there is a “[w]omen’s right to a life free from gender-based
311. See U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 19, supra note 116, ¶¶ 6–7. It is important to
note that these developments do not explicitly articulate violence against women as a
human rights violation in and of itself.
312. Id. ¶ 6. Note that there is not a single provision in CEDAW that expressly
mentions violence.
313. See Manjoo, supra note 117, ¶ 23:
In general recommendation No. 19, the Committee establishes that gender-
based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under
human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article
1 of the Convention and links gender-based violence to the different rights
and substantive areas covered by the Convention . . . . The adoption of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention, in 1999, and the subsequent jurispru-
dence thereunder further reinforce the Committee’s position that violence
against women equates to discrimination based on sex, which disproportion-
ately affects women. It is important to note that these developments do not
explicitly articulate violence against women as a human rights violation in
and of itself.
(Emphasis added).
314. U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, art. 3.
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violence” that “is indivisible from and interdependent with other
human rights.”315
It could be argued that DEVAW, as well as CEDAW Committee’s
general316 and case-specific317 recommendations, can serve as tools
of interpreting CEDAW under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.318
DEVAW, adopted without vote by the United Nations General
Assembly,319 directly references CEDAW320 and may be considered
an “instrument which was made by one or more parties in connec-
tion with the conclusion of [CEDAW] and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to [CEDAW]”321 or a “subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
[CEDAW] or the application of [CEDAW] provisions.”322 The practice
of states complying with CEDAW Committee’s recommendations
may be considered “subsequent practice in the application of
[CEDAW] which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
[CEDAW] interpretation.”323
There is promise in stating that nonbinding sources, such as
DEVAW and CEDAW Committee’s recommendations, may be used
as essential elements of CEDAW interpretation. However, these
interpretative tools do not clearly attest to the existence of a binding
treaty obligation to eliminate gender-based violence.
For instance, Article 6 of DEVAW states that “[n]othing in the
present Declaration shall affect any provision that is more conducive
to the elimination of violence against women that may be contained
in the legislation of a State or in any international convention, treaty
or other instrument in force in a State.”324 This cautious phrasing
315. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 15.
316. See id.; U.N. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 116.
317. Adopted following individual complaints procedure under OP-CEDAW A/RES/54
/4. See, e.g., A.T. v. Hungary, Communication No. 2/2003, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/2003
¶¶ 8.4–8.6 (Jan. 26, 2005); Goekce v. Austria Communication No. 5/2005, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C39/D/5/2005 ¶¶ 12.1.6–12.3 (Aug. 6, 2007); V.K. v. Bulgaria, Communication
No. CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 ¶¶ 9.16–9.17 (July 25, 2011); Inga Abramova v. Belarus,
Communication No. 23/2009, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009 ¶¶ 7.9–7.10 (Sept. 27,
2011); X and Y v. Georgia, Communication No. 24/2009, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/55/D/24
/2009 ¶¶ 11–12 (Oct. 29, 2009); Karen Tayag Vertido v. The Philippines, Communication
No. 18/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 ¶ 8.9 (Sept. 1, 2010); Kell v. Canada, Com-
munication No. 19/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/51/19/2008 ¶¶ 10.2–12 (Aug. 28, 2008).
318. Vienna Conv. on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(2)–(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Conv.].
319. U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, at 217, annex IV, 411; U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th
plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.85 (Dec. 20, 1993).
320. See U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, pmbl., art. 4(a).
321. See Vienna Conv., supra note 318, art. 31(2)(b).
322. Id. art. 31(3)(a).
323. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
324. See U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, art. 6.
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allows states to resort to their domestic law in regulating gender-based
violence if such law is deemed “more conducive” to the elimination
of violence.325 There are hardly any objective criteria to assess what is
“more conducive” to ending violence. Making such an assessment
seems to be left within state discretion.326 DEVAW language, there-
fore, provides a “safety net” of resorting to national standards, making
it less clear whether the universal prohibition of gender-based vio-
lence is, in fact, an integral part of CEDAW.
CEDAW Committee’s general and case-specific pronouncements
remain of recommendatory character and may not reflect the “agree-
ment of [state] parties regarding [CEDAW] interpretation.”327 Given
the unprecedented amount of reservations to even the original (and
carefully negotiated) language of CEDAW,328 it is doubtful that all
states parties fully subscribe to the CEDAW Committee’s conclusions.
The interpretative value of documents produced by this expert body
is significant, but not indisputable.
In the author’s view, the “safe” discretionary language of DEVAW
and the recommendatory character of CEDAW Committee’s state-
ments make it more difficult to interpret CEDAW as an instrument
that contains (or has come to contain) a universal treaty rule on
prohibiting gender-based violence.
However, CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 35
has recently stated that “the prohibition of gender-based violence
against women has evolved into a principle of customary interna-
tional law.”329 This conclusion stems from the Committee’s assessment




328. See Jennifer L. Ulrich, Confronting Gender-Based Violence with International
Instruments: Is a Solution to the Pandemic within Reach, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
629, 645–46 (2000):
[CEDAW] has been subject to an unusually high number of reservations,
making it one of the most reserved human rights treaties in history. This high
number of reservations is due in part to flexible language, as Article 28(2)
permits all reservations that do not thwart the general purpose of the Con-
vention. Although allowing liberal reservations may have increased the
willingness of nations to adopt the Convention, this proliferation of reserva-
tions will ultimately dilute the treaty’s strength. Unfortunately, as a result:
“[CEDAW] may face the paradox of maximizing its universal application at
the cost of compromising its integrity.”
(emphasis added); see also Bantekas & Oette, supra note 193, at 497; Kate Nash,
Women’s Rights Are Human Rights, in THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 120
(John Scott ed., 2015).
329. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 2; see also Dubravka Šimonovi
(Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women), Adequacy of the International Legal
Framework on Violence Against Women, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. A/72/134 (July 19, 2017)
[hereinafter Šimonovi , Adequacy of the International Legal Framework].
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themselves, civil society organizations, academia, United Nations en-
tities, and “other stakeholders.”330 One may still take an optimistic
or a pessimistic view on whether the prohibition has indeed acquired
a customary, and therefore binding, status.
An optimistic approach would be to cite CEDAW Committee Gen-
eral Recommendations Nos. 19 and 35, stating that the prohibition
of gender-based violence has evolved into a principle of customary in-
ternational law331 and is, therefore, directly binding upon stants can
be confirmed by the findings of the International Coutes. The authori-
tative character of CEDAW Committee’s pronouncemert of Justice in
Diallo, when the statements of another treaty body—the Human
Rights Committee—were ascribed great weight.332 The existence of
a customary rule can further be supported by the involvement of
states in drafting DEVAW and its subsequent adoption without
vote.333 Moreover, state practice and opinio juris can be demonstrated
through numerous ratifications of regional human rights instru-
ments.334 Even the ASEAN region, which does not have a binding
instrument to address gender-based violence, has developed the Decla-
ration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN
Region, which references CEDAW and DEVAW in its Preamble.335
Under this optimistic scenario, all 189 states parties to CEDAW
would agree with the CEDAW Committee’s characterization of their
obligations to eliminate gender-based violence as customary and
would challenge neither the existence nor the scope of this binding
obligation, should any dispute arise.
There is also a more pessimistic view. The authority of the
CEDAW Committee may be brought into question, similarly to the
scenario when the United States rejected the Human Rights Commit-
tee’s conclusion that the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights [hereinafter the ICCPR] could apply extraterritorially.336
330. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, pmbl.
331. Id. ¶¶ 2, 9.
332. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Merits, Judgment, 210 I.C.J.
639, 664 ¶ 66 (Nov. 30, 2010).
333. U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, pmbl.; U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note
59, pmbl.
334. Note that the Maputo Protocol references CEDAW and Beijing in its Preamble;
and the Istanbul Convention references CEDAW and CEDAW Committee General
Recommendation No. 19 in its Preamble.
335. ASEAN Doc. Series 2004—Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women in the ASEAN Region (June 30, 2004), https://www.asean.org/wp-content/up
loads/images/archive/ADS-2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFE2-28DB].
336. H.R.C., Gen. Comm. No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, ¶ 10 (May 26,
2004); Jon Kevin Heller, Does the ICCPR Apply Extraterritorially?, OPINIOJURIS (July 18,
2006), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/07/18/does-the-iccpr-apply-extraterritorially [https://
perma.cc/VF7L-ZKZ2].
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Just as the United States rejected the interpretation of ICCPR (with
no reference to extraterritoriality),337 it is not implausible for states
parties to claim that the plain language of CEDAW (with no refer-
ence to violence) should prevail over any emanations therefrom. A
long list of reservations to even the original language of CEDAW338
indicates the reluctance of some states to subject domestic gender
policies to international scrutiny. Recognizing a customary rule on
prohibition of gender-based violence by states would also mean rec-
ognizing their due diligence obligations to prevent, investigate, and
punish violence committed by private actors339—an inference not
easily accepted by states.
Under the pessimistic scenario, states may choose to ignore the
Committee’s findings, stick to the textual interpretation of CEDAW,
and treat DEVAW, Beijing, and CEDAW Committee’s recommenda-
tions as aspirational statements.340
Perhaps, the truth is somewhere in the middle. It is hardly
possible that all states would consider themselves bound by the pro-
hibition of gender-based violence, as defined by the CEDAW Commit-
tee or DEVAW. It is also an exaggeration to expect an overwhelming
rejection of this rule, especially from states that are already parties
to regional agreements prohibiting gender-based violence.
American legal scholar Bonita Meyersfeld, in her work Domestic
Violence and International Law of 2010 maintained that “clarity,
authority and precision are . . . still sorely required”341 to confirm
the status of gender-based violence prohibition as a binding rule. A
year after this publication, the world saw the adoption of the Istan-
bul Convention of 2011—the third regional agreement to declare the
prohibition of gender-based violence as a binding treaty rule. In 2017
CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 35 was issued,
potentially putting an end to “the amorphous process of norm-
crystallization through custom”342 by announcing a fully formed
customary rule.
337. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 2(1).
338. See Ulrich, supra note 328, at 645–46.
339. U.N. DEVAW, supra note 27, art. 4(c); Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 25.
340. The pronouncement that “there is a rule of customary international law that
obliges states to prevent and respond to acts of violence against women with due dili-
gence” has already been made by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences in 2006 long before the CEDAW Committee General Recommen-
dation No. 35. Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 29; see also Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02,
Eur. Ct. H.R. art. 2 (June 9, 2009). Yet it was the adoption of the Istanbul Convention
and development of jurisprudence that truly strengthened the anti-violence framework
and not the identification of a customary rule per se.
341. BONITA MEYERSFELD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (2010).
342. Id.
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So, are we there yet? Is there a black letter rule of international
human rights law prohibiting gender-based violence? The bare facts
are as follows. First, there are three binding regional treaties pro-
hibiting gender-based violence against women.343 Second, CEDAW
does not contain the word “violence” and has never been amended
to include it.344 Third, according to the assessment of the CEDAW
Committee (expressed in a nonbinding recommendation), there is a
universally binding customary rule prohibiting gender-based vio-
lence against women.345
From a public international law perspective, customs are not
less binding than treaties.346 As long as the customary rule of inter-
national law prohibiting gender-based violence exists, there is no
need to go through a hustle of amending or supplementing CEDAW
to explicitly include violence.347 Moreover, nonbinding sources, such
as DEVAW and the CEDAW Committee’s general and case-specific
recommendations, may be used as essential elements of interpreting
CEDAW.348
However, there is a practical and symbolic value in having human
rights explicitly recognized in a binding instrument, as opposed to
inferring rules from a body of subsequent nonbinding interpreta-
tions.349 When Rashida Manjoo, a former Special Rapporteur on
violence against women, its causes and consequences, was advocat-
ing the adoption of a binding legal instrument on violence against
women, she stated that “the lack of a legally binding instrument on
violence against women precludes the articulation of the issue as a
human rights violation in and of itself.”350 She characterized the
situation, where the gender-based violence was reflected only in
nonbinding instruments, as “normativity, without legality.”351
The call for a binding legal instrument addressing gender-based
violence, subsided in the works of the next Special Rapporteur,
343. See Maputo Protocol, supra note 20; Conv. of Belém do Pará, supra note 20;
Istanbul Conv., supra note 20.
344. See U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 19, supra note 116, ¶ 4.
345. See U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 21.
346. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
2009 I.C.J. 213, 237 (July 13).
347. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
348. Vienna Conv., supra note 318, art. 31.
349. G.A., Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Note by the
Secretary-General ¶ 59 U.N. Doc. A/69/368 (Sept. 1, 2014) [hereinafter G.A., Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences].
350. Id.
351. Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences) Rep. on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/26/38, ¶ 76 (May 28, 2014).
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Dubravka Šimonovi .352 She assessed the existing normative frame-
work as adequate, shifting the focus from the normative gap to
“incorporation and implementation gaps.”353 However, while the
Rapporteur was skeptical about the idea of a new standalone instru-
ment on gender-based violence, the possibility of adopting an op-
tional protocol to CEDAW, expressly regulating gender-based vio-
lence, was not put off the table.354 Her report of 2017 called upon
states to “strengthen the implementation of general recommenda-
tion No. 35 and, by that means, test the need for a substantive
optional protocol on violence against women or a mere procedural
protocol along the lines of the Optional Protocol to the Convention
against Torture.”355 Furthermore, the report of 2019 explicitly
recommended the CEDAW Committee to “adopt an optional protocol
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women based on general recommendation No. 35.”356 There-
fore, the question of enhancing the normative value of the prohibi-
tion of gender-based violence through its incorporation in a binding
optional protocol to CEDAW remains relevant.357
If customary international rule on prohibition of gender-based
violence has indeed crystallized, as the CEDAW Committee main-
tains,358 simply reflecting this rule in a binding supplement to an
existing treaty should not be that burdensome of an endeavor. If,
however, the process of codifying this customary rule faces state re-
jection, it could serve as a “litmus test,” showing the lack of genuine
state commitment to gender equality goals and mobilizing critical
response from civil society.
If the treaty codification of the prohibition of gender-based vio-
lence is to happen, it must account for the inclusivity critique.359
Gender-based violence (against persons of diverse genders360) is
352. Šimonovi , Adequacy of the International Legal Framework, supra note 329, ¶ 12.
353. Id.
354. Id. ¶ 13.
355. Id. ¶ 99.
356. Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence Against Women, supra note 40, ¶ 98.
357. Id.
358. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 2; see also Šimonovi , Rep. on
Violence Against Women, supra note 40, ¶ 79.
359. See discussion supra Section II.A.
360. Note that the idea behind broader protections is not to downplay the dispro-
portionate burden of gender-based violence that is borne by women and switch focus to
men, like some men’s organizations suggest (an issue analyzed, inter alia, in Manjoo,
supra note 117, ¶¶ 70–71). The idea is rather to challenge the binary, showing that patriar-
chy, manifested in gender-based violence, affects gender-diverse people (whose struggles
remain invisible in strictly binary frameworks) and backfires at men and boys. It does not
change the fact that empirically it is cisgender men who form the vast majority of per-
petrators of gender-based violence against women, men and gender-diverse persons.
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simply too important an issue to be read between the lines. It de-
serves to be articulated in binding (and more inclusive) instru-
ment(s), within or outside the CEDAW framework. Some of the
possible options include:
1. Adopting a standalone treaty on gender-based violence
that would explicitly extend protection against gender-
based violence to gender-diverse persons.
2. Adopting an optional protocol to CEDAW on gender-
based violence that would explicitly extend protection
against gender-based violence to gender-diverse persons.
3. Adopting an optional protocol to CEDAW on gender-
based violence against women and adopting the
Yogyakarta Principles in the form of a binding treaty,
in order to counterbalance and complement women-
specific treaties with a LGBTQ+ specific one.
The process of expressly codifying the prohibition of gender-based
violence, especially in post-binary terms, may be challenging. A lot
of arguments for a more gender inclusive and binding human rights
instruments are arguments de lege ferenda.361 However, even in the
absence of a binding normative framework, the prohibition of
gender-based violence can be strengthened through a growing body
of human rights jurisprudence and inclusive interpretations of ex-
isting instruments.362
CONCLUSION
Antonio Cassese’s Realizing Utopia—a series of essays discussing
the future of international law—starts with the following statement:
We know that the international society will never be free from
violence, poverty, and injustice. We do not dream of peaceful inter-
national society based on comity, friendship, and cooperation.
We simply intend to suggest in utopian terms new avenues for im-
proving the major deficiencies of the current society of states.363
Similarly, a human rights framework that fully embraces the
post-binary, completely abstains from cultural essentialism, and
definitively codifies the prohibition of gender-based violence may
361. See Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence Against Women, supra note 40, ¶¶ 83–85.
362. G.A., Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, supra note 349, ¶ 59.
363. ANTONIO CASSESE, REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW xxi
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seem utopian.364 However, universal and regional human rights sys-
tems are made of “living instrument[s],”365 sensitive to the change
in public discourse.
The present Article has sought to identify three aspects of
regulating gender-based violence that could be improved to make
the human rights response to gender-based violence more effective
and up to date with evolving realities.
The first avenue for potential improvement is inclusivity. The
developing understanding of gender as a spectrum, rather than a
binary, directly affects the way human rights systems address
gender-based violence.366 In the spirit of trans-inclusive367 and in-
tersectional feminism, it is important to acknowledge that survivors
of gender-based violence are found on different sides of a gender
spectrum.368 While most human rights instruments, addressing
gender-based violence, do so in the context of violence against women,
gender-diverse persons’ right to live a life free from violence also
deserves recognition.369
There is a variety of ways for human rights instruments to
encompass a more inclusive understanding of gender-based violence.
They can generally be divided into three categories:
A. Amending Existing Instruments
Officially amending universal and regional treaties to recognize
gender-based violence as a notion transcending the binary is certainly
a very straightforward way to go. Once adopted, amendments are di-
rectly binding on states, expressly obliging them to eradicate violence
against gender-diverse individuals.370 However, accumulating political
will of states to make changes to CEDAW, the Convention of Belém
364. See id.
365. The term has crystallized in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights
to refer to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
as “a living instrument which . . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day con-
ditions.” See, e.g., Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, No. 5856/72 Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (1978);
Soering v. The United Kingdom, No. 14038/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33 (1989); Selmouni v.
France, No. 25803/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (1999). However, interpretation of the American
Convention on Human Rights and the Convention of Belém do Pará as “living instru-
ment(s)” has also been supported by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
See Violence against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Persons in the Americas,
supra note 172, ¶¶ 39, 52. CEDAW was also called a “dynamic, living instrument” by the
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences. See
Šimonovi , Adequacy of the International Legal Framework, supra note 329, ¶ 84.
366. Monro, supra note 96, at 7.
367. See, e.g., Koyama, supra note 192, at 244.
368. Wathen, supra note 9.
369. Manjoo, supra note 117, ¶¶ 70.
370. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 302, art. 18(3).
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do Pará, the Maputo Protocol, and the Istanbul Convention may be
extremely challenging, if not completely unrealistic. The example of
multiple states making reservations to the original language of
CEDAW shows that even addressing gender equality in binary
terms can be treated less than enthusiastically.371
B. Adopting New Instruments
There is some potential in codifying the prohibition of gender-
based violence in LGBTQ+ specific human rights instruments. Ne-
gotiating a separate treaty on the right of LGBTQ+ people to be free
from violence, built upon nonbinding documents, like the Yogyakarta
Principles 2007 and Yogyakarta Principles 2017, could be a possibil-
ity.372 However, the lack of political will of states could remain a
problem under this scenario.
C. Interpreting Existing Instruments Revolutionarily
Interpretative, judicial, and quasi-judicial bodies, created to
oversee the observance of human rights treaties, undoubtedly, have
a role to play in progressively understanding the notions of gender and
gender-based violence.373 Steps are already being taken in this di-
rection.374 In the recent case of Vicky Hernández and Family v. Hon-
duras, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recognized
the applicability of the Convention of Belém do Pará to transfemi-
cide.375 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 36 recog-
nized the particular vulnerability of lesbian, bisexual, transgender,
and intersex students to violence.376 The Explanatory Report to the
Istanbul Convention clarified that “groups of persons that do not
correspond to what society has established as belonging to ‘male’ or
‘female’ categories” are covered by the nondiscrimination clause of
the document.377 Evolutionary interpretation of human rights treaties,
consistent with progressive understanding of gender, has a potential
of positively impacting human rights frameworks. Although not all
interpretations are binding per se, they are authoritative enough to
371. Ulrich, supra note 328, at 645–46.
372. The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 28, pmbl.
373. G.A. Res. 447 (IX), art. 19(d), Statute of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Oct. 1979).
374. See Vicky Hernández and Family, Honduras, Case 13.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Rep. No. 157/18, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170, doc. 179 ¶ 98 (2018).
375. Id.
376. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 36, supra note 128, ¶ 46.
377. Explanatory Rep. to the Istanbul Conv., supra note 141, ¶ 53.
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foster change in the long term.378 For that gradual change to
happen, the body of such interpretations, enshrined in recommen-
dations, judicial decisions, commentaries, and analytics should con-
tinue to develop.
The second avenue for potential improvement is related to
understanding patriarchy. Conceptualizing patriarchy as an ideolog-
ical basis of gender-based violence can help those making and
applying human rights law form a comprehensive picture of whom
patriarchy affects and on what scale.379 Patriarchy as a value system
is largely dependent on the immutable gender binary and the prede-
termined hierarchy between the two (and only two) sexes.380
This Article makes two key observations about patriarchy that
are relevant in human rights framework:
1. Patriarchy is characterized by both the idea of women’s inferiority
to men and the idea of heteronormativity, leading to an immediate
intersection between women’s and LGBTQ+ rights.
Patriarchy is based on the presumption that there are two
genders—men (the superior gender) and women (the inferior gen-
der).381 Each gender is expected to follow accepted “womanly” or
“manly” behaviors.382 Under patriarchy, women are only attracted to
men and men are only attracted to women.383 The binary and
heteronormative character of patriarchy entails that it not only legiti-
mizes oppression of women, but also oppression of transgender
persons and sexual minorities.384 It is important to observe this
feature of patriarchy to boost inclusivity and intersectionality of
human rights instruments. Patriarchy is oftentimes the shared un-
derlying cause of violence against women and violence against
LGBTQ+ persons.385 It is, therefore, important for human rights
mechanisms to reflect this interconnectedness and note the impact
patriarchal beliefs have on all vulnerable groups.
378. Šimonovi , Adequacy of the International Legal Framework, supra note 329, ¶
43.
379. U.N. ESCOR, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work
of the Commission, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994) [hereinafter U.N.
ESCOR, Further Promotion].
380. See U.N. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(3).
381. See id.
382. BUTLER, supra note 86, at 24.
383. Id. at 17.
384. Coomaraswamy, supra note 207, ¶ 102.
385. Id.
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2. Patriarchy within cultures must not be equated with cultures
themselves.
Another observation in addressing patriarchy as the cause of
gender-based violence is its overarching and universal nature.386
The Article shares the concerns of scholars about associating gender-
based violence with only certain (usually non-Western) cultures and
cautions against such approach.387 Not only can such a lens cause
backlash from countries, the cultures of which are explicitly or implic-
itly labeled as violent, it also fails to account for the true scale of
patriarchy as a universal phenomenon that still dominates power
structures all across the globe.388 An approach, which criticizes patri-
archal patterns within cultures, without marginalizing cultures, is
the most effective in addressing the roots of gender-based violence.
The third avenue for potential improvement is normativity. The
prohibition of gender-based violence (even in its narrower under-
standing as violence against women) has been codified in regional,
but not in universal human rights instruments.389 While there is a
significant body of CEDAW Committee’s interpretations of gender-
based violence as discrimination, enshrined both in its general and
case-specific recommendations, the normative status of the prohibi-
tion of gender-based violence can still be brought into question.390
There have been claims made by both the CEDAW Committee and
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences that the prohibition of gender-based violence against
women has crystallized into a binding customary rule of interna-
tional human rights law.391 However, these views are disputable.392
There are several ways of increasing the normative value and
effectiveness of existing frameworks regulating gender-based violence:
3. Adopting a standalone treaty on gender-based violence.
A proposition of adopting a binding treaty on gender-based
violence (against women) was championed by the third Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Conse-
quences, Rashida Manjoo.393 Having identified a normative gap in
386. See U.N. ESCOR, Further Promotion, supra note 379, ¶ 50.
387. See Ertürk, supra note 228, ¶ 20.
388. Id.
389. MCQUIGG, supra note 139, at 3.
390. Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence Against Women, supra note 40, ¶ 84.
391. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 2; Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence
Against Women, supra note 40, ¶ 79.
392. Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence Against Women, supra note 40, ¶ 43.
393. G.A., Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, supra note 349.
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international human rights law,394 she continually suggested that
“it is essential that the United Nations system adopts a legally
binding framework on violence against women and girls.”395
This position was criticized by subsequent Special Rapporteur
Dubravka Šimonovi , who stated that “the option of creating a
separate treaty would expose the existing legal framework under
the Convention on violence against women to the risk of isolating
provisions aimed at addressing gender-based violence against women
from the structural causes of discrimination against women.”396 She
focused on implementation gaps, rather than the normative gap in
existing human rights framework.397 Even though the vast majority
of civil society organizations asked to assess the need for a new
treaty actually supported it,398 the critique of adopting a brand new
instrument is also understandable. Indeed, there may be “a conside-
rable political risk in seeking to negotiate a new treaty, which might
encompass lower standards than those already widely accepted”399
or a “risk in diverting meaningful energy from implementation of
existing norms.”400
While the idea of adopting a new treaty on gender-based violence
may seem overambitious and hard to implement in the current po-
litical climate, expressly codifying the prohibition of gender-based
violence has a potential of sending a powerful message. If the claims
on the customary nature of such a prohibition are indeed true,
reflecting the already formed rule in a binding instrument does not
appear disproportionately burdensome.401 If, however, the codifica-
tion process faces state rejection, the act of rejection itself could
reveal the lack of genuine state commitment to gender equality
goals, mobilizing response and condemnation from civil society.
4. Adopting an optional protocol to CEDAW.
Adopting an optional protocol to CEDAW, explicitly codifying
the prohibition of gender-based violence (ideally—against persons
394. Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences) Report on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/29/27, ¶ 65 (June 10, 2015).
395. Id.; see also Manjoo, supra note 117, ¶ 76.
396. Šimonovi , Adequacy of the International Legal Framework, supra note 329, ¶ 91.
397. Id. ¶¶ 69, 94.
398. Id. ¶ 41.
399. Id. ¶ 25.
400. Id. ¶ 60.
401. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 2; Šimonovi , Rep. on Violence
Against Women, supra note 40, ¶ 79.
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of any gender, else—against women, subject to evolutionary inclusive
interpretation), is a perfect compromise between adopting a new
treaty and leaving gender-based violence in the realm of nonbinding
instruments and interpretations.
In the current Special Rapporteur’s opinion, “an optional proto-
col to the Convention is . . . a long-term solution . . . which could aid
implementation.”402 The prospect of supplementing the CEDAW
framework with a binding optional protocol is promising. Given the
significant body of jurisprudence on gender-based violence devel-
oped by the CEDAW Committee, as well as its General Recommen-
dations Nos. 19 and 35, there are reasons to hope for state support
on the matter.403 The risks associated with this process are similar
to the ones associated with negotiating a new treaty. Likewise, the
lack of state engagement in adopting a protocol can have reputa-
tional risks for states who would choose to ignore the gender-based
violence agenda.404
5. Adopting the Yogyakarta Principles in the form of a binding treaty.
Gender-based violence is referenced in women-specific instru-
ments and interpretations thereof.405 Balancing the status quo to
ensure protection of gender-diverse individuals can be done not only
through amending women-specific instruments, but though encour-
aging the adoption of LGBTQ+ specific ones.406 While the Yogyakarta
Principles have not yet acquired universal state support, there is
promise in drawing the attention of states and international organi-
zations to the side of gender-based violence that affects gender-
diverse persons and sexual minorities. While the normative value
of gender-based violence prohibition would be highest if the rules
enshrined in the Yogyakarta Principles are recognized in a binding
treaty, their normative value can also be strengthened over time
through authoritative progressive interpretation.
The eradication of gender-based violence is only partially de-
pendent on perfecting human rights frameworks and instruments.407
Gender-based violence is not merely a matter of positivist discussion
on how masterfully legal documents are drafted.408 Even the most
inclusive and binding documents could lack de facto effectiveness if
402. Id. ¶ 93.
403. U.N. CEDAW, Gen. Rec. No. 35, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
404. Manjoo, supra note 394, ¶¶ 63, 65.
405. Manjoo, supra note 117, ¶ 70.
406. See Violence against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Persons in the
Americas, supra note 172, ¶¶ 39.
407. International Women’s Day Statement, supra note 195.
408. U.N. ESCOR, Further Promotion, supra note 379, ¶ 50.
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patriarchy is not dismantled on individual, family, and societal
levels.409 Both legal and political commitments are often ignored in
practice, allowing gender-based violence to continue.410 An inter-
disciplinary approach is key in addressing gender-based violence.
Alongside with improving the effectiveness of legal frameworks,
efforts should be made to spread human rights education, support
local communities, fund civil society organizations, and provide
support and resources to survivors of violence.
Although the discussion about gender-based violence goes well
beyond the framework of CEDAW and regional human rights
treaties, it starts with a fundamental human right to live a life free
from violence. Embracing inclusivity helps realize the true scale of
gender-based violence. Understanding patriarchy, deeply embedded
in global power structures, helps identify the causes of gender-based
violence. Strengthening the normative basis helps frame gender-
based violence as a central and not collateral matter in the human
rights discourse.
In a constantly evolving world, the effectiveness of human rights
systems is measured by their ability to embrace new developments
and combat emerging challenges.411 It is only natural to demand
comprehensive protections against gender-based violence from hu-
man rights instruments. The effectiveness of existing frameworks
can be enhanced in a variety of ways—better texts, better interpre-
tations, better implementation. The cooperation between mecha-
nisms and mandates, the partnerships of grassroots organizations
and global platforms, the solidarity of all actors in their struggle to
achieve gender equality helps spearhead the progressive agenda.
Even though legal frameworks regulating gender-based violence are
unlikely to ever produce a perfect utopia, the will to evolve and de-
velop brings us closer to a world free from violence.412
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